






The Departmental Structure of Executive Power: 
Subordinate Checks from Madison to Mueller 
Blake Emerson† 
This Article examines the departmental structure of the executive 
branch, which facilitates, channels, and delimits the exercise of executive 
power. This structure is grounded in the text of the Constitution, which 
refers to “Department[s]” in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Appoint-
ments Clause, and Opinion Clause. The concept of the department also 
played a key role in the Framers’ constitutional theory of checks and bal-
ances. Public law has implemented the scheme that constitutional text and 
theory outlined. Legislation, case law, and executive branch practice have 
constructed departments within the executive branch as durable reposito-
ries of authority that distribute and rationalize power. Departmental pro-
tections against official arbitrariness have been tested in recent events, 
such as the Special Counsel Investigation, the effort to add a citizenship 
question to the census, and controversies concerning the leadership of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The departmental structure of ex-
ecutive power must be maintained with renewed investments from each of 
the constitutional branches. 
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The Constitution vests “the executive Power” in the President.1 But 
there is more to execution than power. This Article will show that the ex-
ecutive power is checked by the internal organization of the executive 
branch. The Constitution provides that the branch is to include “Depart-
ments”2 with discrete jurisdictions, procedures, and obligations. These de-
partments enable but also channel and constrain the discretionary author-
ity wielded by the President, as well as that of the principal officers he 
appoints. The departmental structure of the Executive separates the law’s 
administration from the viewpoints and interests of any one official. It 
thereby guards against arbitrary rule and preserves public commitments 
across time. 
The Trump Administration has thrown the contrast between the ex-
ecutive power and the executive departments into stark relief. President 
Trump has asserted that he has “the right to do whatever I want as Presi-
dent.”3 His allies have promised a “deconstruction of the administrative 
state,”4 railed against a bureaucratic “deep state,”5 and insisted that the 
                                                                                                             
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
2. Id., § 2, cls. 1, 2. 
3. Michael Bryce-Saddler, While Bemoaning Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely Says the 
Constitution Gives Him ‘The Right to Do Whatever I Want’, WASH. POST (July 23, 2019, 9:46 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-
teens-constitution-gives-him-right-do-whatever-i-want/ [https://perma.cc/Y9CT-X9N3]. 
4. Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the 




5. E.g., Victor Davis Hanson, Deep State Coup of Trump Presidency Doesn’t Seem So 
Far Fetched, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.washington-
times.com/news/2019/nov/20/deep-state-coup-of-trump-presidency-doesnt-seem-so/ 
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President “alone is the executive branch.”6 Presidential appointees have 
acted with disregard and sometimes open hostility to professionals within 
their departments.7 Civil servants, in turn, have occasionally resisted pres-
idential will.8 The Executive has been divided against itself. 
As unique as the Trump Administration may be, it is in some respects 
continuous with the “personal presidency” that has developed over the 
course of the past century.9 Presidents have asserted and enacted directive 
authority over the executive branch on the basis of their claim to speak on 
behalf of the nation as whole.10 Over time, these increasingly expansive 
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/527Z-C9XE]. For a review of and response to this critique, see Jon D. Michaels, 
The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653 (2018). 
6. Memorandum To: Deputy Assistant Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, Assistant At-
torney General Steve Engel, From: Bill Barr, Re: Mueller’s “Obstruction” Theory (June 8, 2018), 
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/549-june-2018-barr-memo-to-doj-
mue/b4c05e39318dd2d136b3/optimized/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BRD-MX4P]. 
7. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, The Executive Power of Political Emergency: The Travel Ban, 
87 UMKC L. REV. 611, 615 (2019) (“One of the reasons Travel Ban One caused so much confu-
sion, both legally and practically, is that it was not vetted through career immigration law experts 
in the relevant agencies.”); Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in Destroying a 
Bureaucracy From Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/04/16/magazine/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/8DHL-SHQM] (“Mulvaney’s careful campaign of deconstruction [of the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau] offers a case study in the Trump administration’s approach to 
transforming Washington, one in which strategic neglect and bureaucratic self-sabotage create 
versions of agencies that seem to run contrary to their basic premises.”); Ryan McCrimmon, Econ-
omists Flee Agriculture Department After Feeling Punished Under Trump, POLITICO (May 7, 
2019, 5:03 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/07/agriculture-economists-leave-trump-
1307146 [https://perma.cc/4N28-BTRK]. See infra notes 364-380 for further examples. 
8. Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 351 (2019) (“Bu-
reaucrats seem to be increasingly opposing the President in their official capacity.”); Bijal Shah, 
Civil Servant Alarm, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 635 (2019) (“[R]esistance from the immigration 
bureaucracy under G.W. Bush and Obama was not only less common than resistance to Trump, 
but also did not provoke retaliatory political responses . . . .”); Michael D. Shear, Leading Home-
land Security Under a President Who Embraced ‘Hate-Filled Talk,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/us/politics/elaine-duke-homeland-security-trump.html 
[https://nyti.ms/3fljgDB] (As Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Elaine 
Duke said “she did not include policy reasons in the memo [rescinding the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy] because she did not agree with the ideas being pushed by Mr. 
Miller and Mr. Sessions: that DACA amounted to an undeserved amnesty and that it would en-
courage new waves of illegal immigration.”); Laurie McGinley, Lena H. Sun, Yasmeen Abutaleb, 
& Josh Dawsey, Trump’s Pandemic Agenda Shoved Government Scientists Aside. They’re At-
tempting an 11th-hour Comeback, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2020, 5:11 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/health/2020/10/30/trump-scientists-covid/ [https://perma.cc/NGC9-A6PM]. 
9. THEODORE LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE 
UNFULFILLED 97-98, 137-153 (1985). 
10. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head in whose 
choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and expectations.”); 
Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation” 55 Op. O.L.C. 59, 60-61 (1981) (gener-
ally approving of White House review of agency regulations in part on the basis that “because the 
[P]resident is the only elected official with a national constituency, he is uniquely situated to design 
and execute a uniform method of undertaking regulatory initiatives that responds to the will of 
the public as a whole.”); The President’s Committee on Administrative Management, 
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assertions of unilateral, discretionary power have challenged the durable 
norms and procedures of administrative agencies.11 Presidents have at-
tempted to wield the federal bureaucracy as the instrument of their “char-
ismatic legitimacy.”12 The Supreme Court has sometimes condoned these 
efforts. It has justified judicial deference to agencies on the basis of the 
democratic credentials of the “Chief Executive.”13 More recently, the 
Court has broadened the President’s power to remove administrative offi-
cials.14 Commentators argue in the same vein that the Constitution requires 
a “unitary executive,”15 or else that bureaucratic “accountability” and “ef-
fectiveness” can best be achieved through “presidential administration.”16 
Some have challenged the constitutionality of administrative agencies that 
operate independently from the President.17 Administration is either part 
and parcel of the President’s executive power, or it is constitutionally sus-
pect.18 
Against such dominant presidentialism, this Article contends that the 
constitutional structure of the department provides a foundation for the 
administrative state that is separate from the President’s executive power. 
The term “Department” appears in the Opinion Clause19 and Appoint-
ments Clause20 of Article II as well as in the Necessary and Proper Clause 
                                                                                                             
Administrative Management in the Government of the United States 2 (1937) (“The President is 
the Chief Executive and administrator within the [f]ederal system and service.”). 
11. See LARRY BERMAN, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE 
PRESIDENCY, 1921-1979, at 74 (1979); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: 
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 20, 425 (1993); Terry M. Moe & Scott A. 
Wilson, The President and the Politics of Structure, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (1994). 
12. Daphna Renan, The President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2020). 
13. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely ap-
propriate for this political branch of the Government to make . . . policy choices.”). 
14. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 
U.S. 477 (2010). 
15. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Ex-
ecutive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1553 (1992). 
16. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2252 (“[T]he 
new presidentialization of administration renders the bureaucratic sphere more transparent and 
responsive to the public, while also better promoting important kinds of regulatory competence 
and dynamism.”); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Admin-
istration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85-106 (1992). 
17. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2575 (2011) (Free Enterprise Fund “log-
ically implies the unconstitutionality of agency independence”). 
18. City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013) (noting that agency 
actions may “take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our 
constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power’”). 
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, 
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the 
Duties of their respective Offices . . . .”). 
20. Id. § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.”). 
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of Article I.21 In each of these contexts, “Department” means a durable 
organization of offices with a limited jurisdiction. It is a subdivision of a 
greater authority, ordinarily composed of multiple officials who together 
carry out the tasks within their remit. 
Departments serve as bulwarks of the rule of law. They each facilitate 
the exercise of their principal officers’ powers, permitting delegation, spe-
cialization, and a “system” for the application of policy.22 But the depart-
ment’s head is also restrained by the institutional apparatus that assists her. 
She cannot act with disregard for the existing procedures, practices, and 
jurisdictional boundaries of her department. Departments establish “sub-
ordinate distributions of power” that internalize the checks and balances 
that exists between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.23 This 
scheme of “articulated governance” distinguishes regulations, adjudica-
tions, and enforcement decisions from the discretion of any one official.24 
Departments also further specialization and reduce the risk of error and 
arbitrariness. Their internal processes help to ensure that power is exer-
cised in a regular, consistent, and reasoned fashion. And departments en-
dure. They usually predate and then persist after any particular presiden-
tial administration, providing for the continuity of public services and 
purposes across time. 
While the term “Department” provides an anchor for the administra-
tive state within the Constitution’s text, the structures and norms that at-
tach to such departments do not derive from the founding document alone. 
Departments are composites of public law consisting of multiple sources, 
including general constitutional theory, specific constitutional rules con-
cerning official appointment and judicial review, statutory law establishing 
departments, and the internal rules and regulations that departments 
themselves generate.25 This cluster of norms is traceable in part to the 
                                                                                                             
21. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 (“[T]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”) The 
term “department” also appears in the 25th Amendment, which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
22. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 393 (James Madison) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphasizing 
“system” in structure of Treasury Department); Office and Duties of the Attorney General, 6 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 326, 346 (1856) (“The organization of the executive departments of administration 
implies . . . system . . . .”). 
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
24. Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C.L. REV. 433, 
456-59 (2013); see also EDWARD RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW 
FOR THE MODERN STATE 25-26 (2005) (describing the “articulation of structure” in the adminis-
trative state). 
25. See JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 12 (2012) (defining the “the ad-
ministrative constitution” as including those “relatively stable patterns of institutional interaction 
that defined the role of Congress and the President in administration, that established the basic or 
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internal logic of a constitution that contemplates jurisdictionally distinct 
units within the executive branch. But departmental norms are also a prod-
uct of official handiwork, as judges, legislators, and executive officers have 
relied on the text to develop a practicable scheme of governance. In 1833, 
for instance, Justice John McLean held that principal officers were often 
required to develop a “kind of common law” to govern affairs within their 
department.26 Attorney General Caleb Cushing introduced the term “ad-
ministrative law” in 1856 to refer to opinions of the Attorney General,27 
which “officially define the law” within the executive departments.28 These 
and other holdings have secured a separation between political will and 
legal obligation within the Executive. But departmental norms are not self-
executing. They will require ongoing explication, maintenance, and en-
forcement from the constitutional branches if they are to continue to mod-
ulate the exercise of political power.29 
This argument has implications for both formalist and functionalist 
understandings of executive power and the administrative state.30 Formal-
ists maintain that the Constitution’s text, as originally understood, divides 
all federal power into three and only three mutually exclusive categories—
legislative, executive, and judicial.31 This view underlies the unitary execu-
tive theorists’ conclusion that administrative agencies exercise executive 
power and must therefore be subject to the exclusive direction of the Pres-
ident.32 Focus on departmental structures complicates that picture. A for-
malist understanding of the Executive must reckon with the way in which 
the President’s “executive Power”33 relates to “executive Departments.”34 
The original public meaning and certain aspects of the Framers’ 
                                                                                                             
default structure of administrative institutions, . . . [and] that confirmed the authority of senior 
officials to regularize administration by rule”). 
26. United States v. MacDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833). 
27. Caleb Cushing, Office and Duties of the Attorney General, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 343 
(1856). 
28. Id. at 334. 
29. See Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 
IOWA L. REV. 139, 145 (2018) (arguing that “internal actors and mechanism are inextricably, sym-
biotically interwoven with the external” checks provided by the constitutional branches, and thus 
not substituting for “the traditional separation of powers”). 
30. On formalism and functionalism, see M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136-45 (2000). 
31. Lawrence Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Le-
gal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CON. L. 155, 166, 185 (2006) 
(noting that formalists usually adopt originalist methods); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments 
and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 857-58 (1990). 
32. See Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the 
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 314-16, 353 (1989); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 568-70 (1994); City of 
Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013). 
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
34. Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
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constitutional thought imply that executive departments might check the 
exercise of executive power.35 But the constitutional text and context alone 
do not clearly specify the legal relation between power and departments. 
Originalist methodology then directs us to see how legal actors have “con-
structed” textual indeterminacies over time.36 This Article shows that, 
since at least the mid-nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth, the 
three branches have understood departments to constrain the conduct of 
executive officers.37 Even if the unitary executive theorists are correct that 
the President may control subordinate officers, both the subordinate offic-
ers as well as the President are limited by departmental rules.38 
The argument also enriches functionalist understandings of the con-
stitutional structure of the administrative state. Functionalists understand 
the Constitution to set up three overlapping authorities and hold that the 
core role of each branch must be preserved in the design and supervision 
of each federal agency and officer.39 They focus less narrowly on textual 
requirements and more on working arrangements of government that 
serve constitutional values.40 Departments, from this perspective, carry out 
the Constitution’s design of “separateness but interdependence”41 among 
the three branches. They are within the executive branch but are created 
by Congress. They are governed by rules that may or may not align with 
the interests and preferences of the current chief executive. Departments 
thereby impose internal limits on the executive power. 
Understanding the departmental structure of the Executive should 
modify functionalist conceptions of the proper relationship between con-
stitutional branches and administrative agencies. Functionalists tradition-
ally emphasize that the three branches must “share the reins of control” 
over such agencies.42 This Article, by contrast, focuses on how departments 
                                                                                                             
35. See infra Part II. 
36. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5-9 (1999). Whittington lists “creation of executive depart-
ments” and “creation of independent regulatory commissions” in a table of constitutional con-
structions. Id. at 12. While Whittington understands construction as a political rather than legal 
process, I understand construction to generate legally binding rules, even if it is undertaken by 
actors other than courts. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103-7 (2010). 
37. See Part III, infra. 
38. United States v. MacDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683 (1974). See infra Part IV. 
39. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987). 
40. See Magill, supra note 30, at 1143-44; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291-95 
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
41. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism 
in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21-24 (1998). 
42. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 580 (1984). But see JON MICHAELS, 
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themselves place controls on executive power. Though departments are 
created by statute and led by political appointees, they are not best under-
stood as obedient servants of either Congress or of the President. Depart-
ments do not merely follow orders, they make orders orderly. They help to 
ensure that we are governed not by the will of particular officials but by 
fairly predictable, minimally rational, and suitably general norms. 
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I sets forth the constitu-
tional text and theory that outline the departmental structure of executive 
power. Part II then shows how departmental structures were erected in the 
first hundred years of American public law, including through statutory 
law establishing departments, judicial decisions concerning executive offic-
ers, and opinions of Attorneys General concerning the scope of the Presi-
dent’s executive power. Part III demonstrates how administrative law in 
the twentieth century elevated the significance of departmental norms of 
regular and distributed decision-making, focusing on the law of independ-
ent commissions, the binding effect of agency rules, and the requirement 
that agencies provide reasoned justifications for their actions. Part IV then 
evaluates contemporary controversies that center around the depart-
mental structure of the executive branch: Secretary Ross’ decision to add 
a citizenship question to the census,43 constitutional and political conflicts 
over the leadership of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,44 and 
the Special Counsel’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 
election.45 Each of these cases show the continuing importance of depart-
mental norms in restraining arbitrary power. But they also show that judi-
cial and executive officials have failed  to adequately safeguard the institu-
tional framework that embanks political discretion. More explicit 
recognition of departments’ independent value would further protect law’s 
administration from arbitrary assertions of political power. Greater care 
for departmental norms will be necessary to ensure that our government 
remains one of laws and not one of persons. 
I. The Departmental Constitution: Text and Theory 
This Part introduces the significance of departments in constitutional 
text and theory. Departments are a key structural feature of the 
                                                                                                             
CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 57-75 (2017) 
(offering an account of the “administrative separation of powers” that serves similar functions to 
the system of checks and balances at the constitutional level). 
43. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569-71, 2573-76 (2019). 
44. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 
75, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
45. See SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2 REPORT 
ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 
(Mar. 2019). The Report nonetheless indicates that the Special Counsel was unable to reach the 
conclusion that President Trump “clearly did not commit obstruction of justice.” Id. at 2. 
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Constitution’s “arrangement of officeholders, laid out in their respective 
jurisdictions, selection, tenures, and duties.”46 The Constitution’s text dis-
tinguishes between the power held by officials and the rule-bound organi-
zations those officials operate within. However, the relationship between 
official power and institutional order is underspecified by the text on its 
face. Consulting the constitutional theory of the Framers, we learn that de-
partments serve rule-of-law values: departments separate power from any 
one official’s will and condition its exercise on the input of several officials 
with different roles and responsibilities. This theoretical background helps 
to explain the normative significance of the departmental structures the 
three branches jointly generated over the subsequent course of American 
legal development. 
Attention to the Constitution’s departmental text and background 
theory recasts longstanding debates concerning the relationship between 
the President’s executive power and the administration of statutory law. 
Since the Founding, constitutional actors and theorists have been at odds 
over the President’s authority over other executive branch officials.47 To-
day’s adherents to the “unitary executive theory,” assert that the President 
may direct or remove any official within the executive branch.48 “Plural-
ists,” by contrast, insist that Congress may vest independent decisional au-
thority in officers other than the President and insulate such officers from 
removal.49 Building on the work of scholars such as Gillian Metzger, 
Daphna Renan, and Jon Michaels, this Article shifts focus from the Presi-
dent’s authority over particular officials to the constitutional architecture 
within which such officials operate.50 Individual officers exercise power 
against the backdrop of complex repositories of authority that other 
                                                                                                             
46. Karen Orren, Officers’ Rights: Toward a Unified Theory of American Constitutional 
Development, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 873, 879 (2000). 
47. E.g., JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 125-63 (2018). 
48. E.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 32, at 593-99. 
49. E.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER 
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34-42 (2009); Peter Strauss, Foreward: Overseer or “The 
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007). 
50. The Article builds on the previous work of other public-law scholars who have fo-
cused on executive structure and organization rather than the command authority of the President 
in relation to other officers. See generally Gillian Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 
126 YALE L.J. 1836, 1880 (2015) (arguing that the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed” can usually best be fulfilled through steady managerial supervision rather than 
direct assertions of authority); Jon Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: 
An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016) (arguing 
that the internal organization of the Executive reinstitutes the constitutional separation of pow-
ers); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98 TEX. 
L. REV. 265 (2019) (arguing that coordination, collaboration, and contestation between state and 
federal executives pluralizes the executive power). On separating the President as person from the 
presidency as office, see Renan, supra note 12, at 1133-38, and Aziz Huq, Article II and Antidis-
crimination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 47, 70-71 (2018). 
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officials above, alongside, and beneath them have a duty to safeguard. To-
day, we would most naturally call these frameworks “institutions.”51 The 
Constitution has its own term: they are “Departments.” 
Departments provide a natural place for the administrative state in a 
Constitution that many scholars have seen as at best indifferent and at 
worst hostile to bureaucratic forms of government. Some formalist schol-
ars and jurists see administrative law generally as constitutionally suspect,52 
or else assimilate administration to “executive power” and thus to the Pres-
ident’s discretionary control.53 The conventional response from function-
ally minded administrative law scholars has been eloquently expressed by 
Jerry Mashaw: “There was a hole in the Constitution where administration 
might have been.”54 On this view, the Constitution is mostly silent about 
how administration should be structured. Administrative law then emerges 
from legislation and from the agency rules and judicial case law that inter-
pret it. 
This Article shows instead that the term “Department” provides a 
home for administrative agencies within the Constitution’s text. The argu-
ment does not presume or embrace a formalist or originalist view of con-
stitutional interpretation. But its approach is consistent with those meth-
ods to the extent that it begins with the Constitution’s text concerning 
“Departments” and the use of that term in the constitutional discourse of 
the founding period. The claim is not that the eighteenth-century constitu-
tional text or the political theory of the Framers somehow foreordained 
the detailed arrangements of our administrative state. Rather, the claim is 
that the Constitution’s underspecified departmental structure has provided 
a rough-hewn foundation on which administrative law’s edifice of deliber-
ative, rule-oriented, and institutionally dispersed decision-making has 
been built over the past centuries.  
                                                                                                             
51. James G. March & Johan P. Olson, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors 
in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 751 (1984) (describing a “new institutionalism” in the 
social sciences that examines “the collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physi-
cal arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of 
individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individual-
ism”). 
52. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 1 (2014) (arguing that 
administrative law is “unrecognized by the Constitution”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of 
the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1253 (1994) (“[O]ne cannot have allegiance 
both to the administrative state and to the Constitution.”). 
53. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304 n. 4 (2013); Saikrishna Prakash, 
Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 
YALE L.J. 991, 991-92 (1993); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE 
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 53 (2016). 
54. Jerry Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1338 (2006). 
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A. Departments in the Constitutional Text 
The text of the Constitution itself is unclear about what departments 
are, where they come from, and what—if any—normative significance they 
hold. The vagueness and ambiguity of the text require a broader examina-
tion of constitutional theory and discourse to elucidate the term’s core 
meaning and referents. 
The term “Department” appears in Clauses 1 and 2 of Article II, Sec-
tion 2. Clause 1 states: “The President . . . may require the Opinion, in 
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices . . . .”55 
Clause 2 states that the President 
 
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . all . . . Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: 
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Offic-
ers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.56 
 
Public law scholars rely on these Clauses to make conflicting arguments 
about the President’s power over the administration of law. For the unitary 
executive theorists, the Opinion Clause shows that the President has di-
rective authority over “principal Officer[s]” within the branch.57 The Ap-
pointments Clause likewise shows that the Constitution contemplates a hi-
erarchical structure of official relations with the President at the apex.58 
The executive pluralists draw the opposite conclusions. The Opinion 
Clause only gives the President the power to require an “Opinion” from 
the principal officers, not to command them as to how to exercise their 
discretion.59 The Appointments Clause gives a central role to Congress, ra-
ther than the President, in structuring official relations through statutory 
law.60 
                                                                                                             
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
56. Id. cl. 2. 
57. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 647 
(1996) (“With the Opinion Clause, the Framers rejected a committee-style Executive Branch in 
favor of a unitary and accountable President, standing under law, yet over Cabinet officers.”); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 62 (arguing that the Clause 
means that the President must have “a measure of substantive authority over the doings of the 
agency.”). 
58. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 720-21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (inferior officers 
remain “under the direct control of the President”). 
59. Strauss, supra note 49, at 717. 
60. Id. at 723; JOSHUA CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE 
AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 98 (2017) (the Appointments Clause “leaves to 
Congress the details of what departments to create and how to structure them”). 
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These debates circle around without squarely addressing the common 
thread between both Clauses: “Departments.” Commentators have ex-
pressed a good deal of puzzlement about the term.61 Constitutional case 
law has come to the conclusion that a “Department” as used in the Ap-
pointments Clause is any “freestanding component of the executive 
branch,” such as the Department of State or the Department of Treasury, 
and encompasses some agencies not labeled “departments,” including the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.62 Part IV will return to that body of 
law. But bracket out our contemporary understanding for the moment. 
The text of the Constitution is mostly silent on what the departments are. 
Departments may have several “Officers” in them, some of whom are 
“principal Officers” or “Heads,” and others who are “inferior.”63 The text 
also indicates that there are several of these “Departments,” not just one.64 
But the departments are not named. Nor is it immediately clear where 
these unnamed departments come from or who has the power to create 
them. The Constitution does not explicitly give to either the President, or 
to Congress, or to any other actor or institution the authority to create or 
to structure the departments referred to in Article II. 
Such a crucial term deserves sustained attention. On its face, it would 
seem impossible to come to determinate resolutions about the power of 
the President and his principal officers without knowing more about these 
departments. That is because departments may have significant bearing on 
the scope and content of these officers’ powers. The principal officers in 
each of these departments must give the President their opinion.65 If the 
department that an officer heads in some way shapes or even controls what 
he may lawfully advise the President to do, then the content of what the 
President may require from the officer is constrained by the department. 
Further, the heads of these departments, who are appointed by the Presi-
dent with senatorial consent, may be given legal authority to appoint infe-
rior officers.66 If the department that an officer heads influences or limits 
whom the head could appoint to such inferior offices, then the President’s 
                                                                                                             
61. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1181 (the Appointments Clause “mysteriously 
recognizes a category of persons, ‘the Heads of Departments,’ who are mentioned in only one 
other place [the Opinion Clause] and are not given any other power by the Constitution”); 
Mashaw, supra note 54, at 1270-71 (“[T]he only explicit power given to the President by the Con-
stitution with respect to executing the laws proper is the power to require reports in writing from 
the heads of departments—whatever ‘departments’ might be.”); Strauss, supra note 42,  at 600 
(describing the “shadowy reference to executive departments” in the Opinion Clause); Lessig & 
Sunstein, supra note 16, at 32-38 (arguing that the “executive Departments” referred to in the 
Opinion Clause are a subset of the “Departments” referred to the Appointments Clause, but con-
ceding that there is no “decisive evidence” for that claim). 
62. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 511 (2010). 
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, 2. 
64. Id. (emphasis added). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
66. Id. cl. 2 
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authority to order the appointment of an officer to an inferior post would 
be to that same extent circumscribed. If the department that an officer 
heads incorporates procedures that prescribe the way in which decisions 
must be made, then the President’s ability to direct the head is limited by 
the procedures the head must follow. And if these departmental con-
straints originate from Congress or from some other actor or agency, then 
the President’s power is hemmed in by those actors, rather than by any 
form of self-limitation. On the other hand, if a department is an empty 
placeholder, signifying no legal rights, duties, or interests, then the Presi-
dent and other officers’ discretion under the applicable legal norms would 
remain fully intact. 
So what is a department? It would be helpful if the rest of the Consti-
tution could give us some guidance. And, indeed, the term “Department” 
also appears in the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I.67 That Clause 
states that Congress has the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”68 The first part of 
the Clause is the usual focus for constitutional case law and commentary, 
granting Congress an instrumental power to carry out the other enumer-
ated powers with which it is vested. 69 But the Clause also grants Congress 
a broader power to effectuate “all other powers,” including those vested in 
“any Department” of the federal government.70 
This aspect of the Clause further complicates rather than clarifies Ar-
ticle II’s references to departments. Some scholars believe that the text 
here refers to the very same departments mentioned in Article II, namely 
the subdivisions of the executive branch.71 Such commentators conclude 
that the Clause gives Congress significant authority to structure the inter-
nal workings of law-administering agencies of the government.72 Other 
commentators, however, believe the departments referred to in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause are the constitutional branches—the executive and 
judiciary, as well as the legislature.73 These scholars then diverge on 
                                                                                                             
67. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
68. Id. 
69. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 558-60 (2012); see John Mi-
khail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1058 (2014). 
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
71. Strauss, supra note 49, at 721 (“[T]he Philadelphia Convention replaced an initial ef-
fort to define government departments in the constitutional text itself with congressional respon-
sibility to define them under the broad language of the Necessary and Proper Clause.”); id. at 721 
n.117; Mashaw, supra note 54, at 1271 n.34. 
72. Strauss, supra note 49, at 721-22. 
73. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 32, at 587 (Congress may use the Necessary and 
Proper Clause “‘to carry[] into execution’ the power of another department of the government, 
such as the executive power or the judicial power”); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1156 
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whether the Clause merely confirms that Congress may passively “help” 
the other branches carry out their enumerated powers,74 or else augments 
Congress’ power with respect to the other branches.75 There is thus consid-
erable but largely unacknowledged disagreement about what the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause refers to with the term “Department.” 
The text on its face therefore leaves several issues unaddressed. It 
does not explain what a department is. Nor does it clarify whether the de-
partments referred to in Article II are the same as those referred to in Ar-
ticle I. Nor does it explain how departments are related to powers. Finally, 
it does not indicate which, if any, constitutional values departments further 
or implement. To explore these issues, this Article begins by examining the 
constitutional discourse of the Founding period. 
B. Departments in Constitutional Discourse 
This Section looks to Founding-era discourse as well as drafting and 
ratification debates to explicate the meaning and referents of the term 
“Department.” While this investigation does not resolve all questions con-
cerning departments, it does give the term some content. As used in the 
Constitution, a department is a specialized division of government in which 
officials exercise their powers. A department is thus different from a 
power. It is the confined rule-structure in which power operates. Given this 
meaning, the term department could be used to refer to the three branches 
of the legislature, executive, and judiciary, which Alexander Hamilton re-
ferred to as the “principal departments.”76 Or it might refer to subdivisions 
                                                                                                             
n.6 (“The Constitution [in the Necessary and Proper Clause] uses the word ‘Department’ to refer 
to the three institutions of our national government.”); William Van Alstyne, The Role of Con-
gress in Determining the Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Com-
ment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 104, 107 
(1976) (“[The Necessary and Proper] clause assigns to Congress alone the responsibility to say by 
law what additional authority, if any, the Executive and the courts are to have beyond that core of 
powers that are indispensable, rather than merely appropriate, or helpful, to the performance of 
their express duties under articles II and III of the Constitution.”); John Manning, The Supreme 
Court 2013 Term—Forward: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) 
(“[The] breadth [of the Necessary and Proper Clause] indicates that the people not only delegated 
the implementation power to Congress, but gave it precedence over the other branches in the 
exercise of such power.”); John Mikhail, supra note 69, at 1100 (“Wilson [who drafted the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause] presumably intended to give Congress whatever instrumental power it 
needed to organize and regulate the other branches and agencies of the government.”); E. Garrett 
West, Note: Congress’ Power over Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 177 (2018) (“The Neces-
sary and Proper Clause gives sweeping authority to Congress to structure the other branches of 
the federal government . . . . Because the text of this grant of congressional power references the 
Vesting Clauses of Article II and Article III, it allows Congress to pass laws augmenting and chan-
neling the powers of the executive and judicial branches.”). 
74. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 32, at 590. 
75. Manning, supra note 73, at 7; Van Alstyne, supra note 73, at 107. Lessig & Sunstein, 
supra note 16, at 67-68 (1992). 
76. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 321 (New York) (Alexander Hamilton) (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 1936). 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:90, 2021 
104 
within the executive branch, which James Madison referred to as the “sub-
ordinate departments.”77 In both uses, departments were generally under-
stood to have normative content. They had rights or interests that were not 
coterminous with the powers vested in any particular officer, but rather 
consisted in the maintenance of a larger pattern of relationships among 
officers. This pattern would distribute authority among several officers to 
check the exercise of power. This core understanding of departments pro-
vides the groundwork for the historical development of the departmental 
structure of the Executive through statutory law and judicial and executive 
branch interpretation. 
A dictionary definition roughly contemporaneous with the drafting 
and ratification of the Constitution defines a department as “a separate 
allotment; a province or business assigned to a particular person: A French 
term.”78 The example given is “The Roman Fleets, during their command 
at sea, had the[i]r several stations and departments; the most considerable 
was the Alexandrian Fleet, and the second was the African.”79 This defini-
tion begins to give some shape to the constitutional text. First, a depart-
ment is a division of authority; it is specialized. Second, this division of au-
thority is based on a jurisdictional grant or limitation—a territory or a 
subject matter that constitutes the department. Third, this separate and ju-
risdictionally limited authority is given to a particular officer. The head of 
department is thus empowered within, but limited to, his department. 
Though originating in French, the term “department” could be heard in 
English political discourse by the late eighteenth century, where it was used 
to refer broadly to various units of the government often headed by a 
                                                                                                             
77. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1781 421 (James Madison) (Max Far-
rand ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
78. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE DEP (1773). In 
French at the time, the definition, in relevant part, was “Distribution. Etendue de pays sur la quelle 
on a quelque pouvoir, en vertu de la Charge ou de la commission qu’on exerce” (“Distribution. 
Area of the country in which one has a certain power, in virtue of the charge or the commission 
one exercises.”) PIERRE RICHELET, DICTIONNAIRE PORTATIF DE LA LANGUE FRANCAISE 472 
(1780) (author’s trans.). 
79. Johnson, supra note 78, at DEP. 
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particular official.80 American colonial constitutional and military dis-
course also used the concept in this way.81 
Departments were associated with the assignment of duties corre-
sponding to personal capacity. In his influential 1781 plan for a federal con-
stitution, the Philadelphia writer Pelatiah Webster proposed creating 
 
three great ministers of state, who ought to be men of the greatest abilities 
and integrity; their business is confined to the several departments, and their 
attention engaged strongly and constantly to all the several parts of the 
same; the whole arrangement, method, and order of which, are formed, su-
perintended, and managed in their offices, and all informations relative to 
their departments centre there.”82 
 
                                                                                                             
80. E.g., OLIVER MORTON DICKERSON, AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT, 1696-
1765: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH BOARD OF TRADE IN RELATION TO THE AMERICAN COLONIES, 
POLITICAL, INDUSTRIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE 107-15 (1912) (describing the role of the British Sec-
retary of State for the “Southern Department” in colonial administration during the eighteenth 
century); 15 THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER; OR HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND 
DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 52 (J. Almon ed. 1780) (“The first Lord of the Admiralty” 
referred to “the importance of the naval department over which he presides” [1779]); id. at 274 
(“The Earl of Pembroke . . . affirm[ed] that the administration of [the army], as well as every other 
department civil and military, was equally weak in itself, injurious to the individuals of the profes-
sion, and destructive of the service.” [1780]) 41 THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER; OR HISTORY 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 379 (J. Debrett ed. 1795) 
(reporting 1795 speech to Parliament referring to “the office of Secretary of State for the foreign 
department”); 31 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 942 (C.T. Hansard ed. 1818) (reporting speech to Parliament in 1796 refer-
ring to an appeal to “the honour of the gentleman at the head of that department, the barrack-
master-general, for the propriety and economy of the manner in which the business is conducted”); 
see also NORMAN CHESTER, THE ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, 1780-1870, at 222 (1981) 
(reporting that in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England, “it was customary to the 
use terms ‘public office,’ ‘office,’ or ‘department’ as interchangeable, usage determining which 
word was chosen in a particular case. Thus it was usual to speak of the Colonial, Foreign, or Home 
Offices but of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. . . . Neither ‘office’ or ‘department’ 
carried the implication of covering the whole of what nowadays would be called a ministry, a term 
not then used with that meaning.”).  
81. E.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXI (“That a long continuance in the first executive 
departments of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, therefore, in those departments, 
is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.”); VALLEY FORGE ORDERLY BOOK OF 
GENERAL GEORGE WEEDON OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY UNDER COMMAND OF GEN’L 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1777-8, at 259 (Dodd, Mead & Co. ed. 1902) (“The 
Continental Congress . . . has been pleased to Resolve, That the Comm’r in chief or the Comm’r 
of a separate Department shall have full power and Authority to suspend or limit power of Grant-
ing, Furloughs . . . .”). 
82. Pelatiah Webster, Dissertation on the Political Union and Constitution of the Thir-
teen United States of North America, in POLITICAL ESSAYS ON THE NATURE AND OPERATION 
OF MONEY, PUBLIC FINANCES, AND OTHER SUBJECTS 162, 213 (1791). On Webster’s significance, 
see Hannis Taylor, Pelatiah Webster: The Architect of Our Federal Constitution, 17 YALE L.J. 
73, 75 (1907) (Webster’s Dissertation provided the “‘wholly novel theory’ of federal government 
upon which reposes the existing constitution of the United States”); HENRY BARRETT LEARNED, 
THE PRESIDENT’S CABINET: STUDIES IN THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND STRUCTURE OF AN 
AMERICAN INSTITUTION (1923) (describing Webster as “a writer of some influence”). 
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He proposed a minister of finance, war, and state.83 This framework for the 
exercise of executive power contemplated division, specialization, and in-
ternal coherence. Each department would be led by someone who was 
both public-interested and skilled within his assigned sphere. 
The debates at the Federal Constitutional Convention confirm that 
“Department” referred to divisions of the government, including, in par-
ticular, the subdivisions of the executive branch. For instance, Alexander 
Hamilton’s “Plan of Government” gave a federal “governour” the sole 
power to appoint “heads or chief officers of the departments of finance, 
war and foreign affairs.”84 Madison referred to debates at the Convention 
concerning “the arrangement of the subordinate Executive depart-
ments.”85 Various other proposals at the Convention and ratification con-
cerning presidential and executive power used the word in the same way.86 
For instance, the Morris-Pinckney plan proposed a “Council of State,” 
composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Secretaries of 
Domestic Affairs, Commerce and Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, and Ma-
rine, with specific duties assigned to each.87 The President could require a 
written opinion from each secretary, who would be “responsible for his 
opinion on the affairs relating to his particular Department.”88 The plan’s 
only surviving trace in the ratified Constitution is the Opinion Clause.89 
                                                                                                             
83. Webster, supra note 82, at 213. 
84. Constitutional Convention. Plan of Government, [June 18, 1787], in 4 THE PAPERS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 207, 208 (Syrett ed., 1962). 
85. From James Madison To Edmund Randolph (31 May 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 189-91, 190 (Hobson et al., eds. 1979) (“Among other subjects on the anvil is the 
arrangements of the subordinate Executive departments. A Unity in each has been resolved on, 
and an amenability to the President alone, as well as to the Senate by way of impeachment.”). 
86. E.g., 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 111 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1937) (George Mason) (“There is also to be a council of revision . . . formed of the principal 
officers of the state, I presume of the members of the Treasury Board, the Board of War, the Navy 
Board, and the Department for Foreign Affairs . . . .”); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 158 (Max. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (James Wilson reporting the Pinck-
ney Plan) (“It shall be [The President’s] Duty . . . to inspect the Departments of Foreign Affairs—
War—Treasury—Admiralty.”); Objections of the Hon. George Mason, in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 494, 495 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827) (“The President of the United States has no constitutional council, (a 
thing unknown in any safe and regular government.) He will therefore be unsupported by proper 
information and advice . . . or a council of state will grow out of the principal officers of the great 
departments”); The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827) (James Wilson) 
(“The President . . . will have also the advice of the executive officers in the different departments 
of the general government.”); id. at 506 (James Wilson) (“[T]he history of the diplomatic corps 
will evince, even in that great department of politics, the truth of an old adage, that ‘honesty is the 
best policy’ . . . .”). 
87. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 342-43. 
88. Id. at 344. 
89. CHARLES THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 124-25 (1923). 
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“Department” was also used in this period in a different but related 
way to refer to the three constitutional branches of government.90 The 1776 
Constitution of Virginia stated that the “Legislative, Executive, and Judi-
cial departments, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the 
powers properly belonging to the other . . . .”91 Georgia and Vermont’s 
Revolution-era constitutions contained nearly identical provisions.92 Like-
wise the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that “the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or ei-
ther of them . . . to the end it may be a government of laws and not of 
men.”93 The provision implied a connection between departments and the 
rule of law, as the separation of official bodies would prevent any particular 
official from asserting absolute power. The concept of department was 
therefore part and parcel of American constitutional law prior to the rati-
fication of the Constitution. It was not merely a synonym for “power.” The 
“department” referred to the official body that exercised various kinds of 
powers within prescribed bounds. 
In his famed defense of the proposed constitution in the Federalist, 
Madison deployed this conception of departments to respond to the objec-
tion that the Constitution’s structure violated Montesquieu’s maxim of the 
separation of powers.94 According to Montesquieu, there were “three sorts 
of powers,” namely the “legislative power,” “executive power,” and the 
“power of judging.”95 These powers ought not to be united “in a single per-
son or body of the magistracy” because such a combination would lead to 
“tyrannical” or “arbitrary” government.96 Madison noted that critics of the 
proposed constitution believed that its structure betrayed Montesquieu’s 
theory, violating “the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and 
judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct.”97 
Madison responded by distinguishing powers from departments, such 
that one department of government might share some of the powers held 
                                                                                                             
90. E.g., GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1878, at 
140, 158 (examples of this use of department in revolutionary writings). 
91. VA. CONST. of 1776, art. III. 
92. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. I; 1786 VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, art. VI. 
93. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX. 
94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 323 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
95. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, at 156-67 (Anne M. Cohler et al., eds. 
1989). 
96. Id. at 157. See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 108 (1965) (for Montesquieu “the separation is necessary to achieve government 
under law and to avoid arbitrary government in which the momentary untrustworthy will of the 
ruler is sovereign”). 
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 323 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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primarily by another.98 He observed that Montesquieu’s “meaning . . . can 
amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one depart-
ment is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of an-
other department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are 
subverted.”99 By distinguishing governmental functions from governmen-
tal institutions—powers from departments—Madison could shape Mon-
tesquieu’s constitutional ideal of separated power into a workable arrange-
ment of distinct but interrelated political divisions.100 It was possible in 
principle to distinguish certain kinds of powers from one another and de-
sirable that they not all be aggregated together. Placing different functions 
in different groups of officers reduced the power held by any one and di-
rected power’s exercise towards the public interest. 
Departments were not merely conceptual divisions but had a real ex-
istence. Madison insisted that more would be required to maintain the sep-
aration of powers than “a mere demarcation on parchment of the consti-
tutional limits of the several departments.”101 He observed that the 
legislative power under the Articles of Confederation had a tendency un-
duly to expand its powers into the executive and judicial realms despite 
textual assurances to the contrary. Thus, “as all these exterior provisions 
are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving 
the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts 
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their 
proper places.”102 Interior structure was the realm of departmental organ-
ization. This structure was built to channel the flow from the “legitimate 
fountain of power,” namely the people.103 As Justice John Marshall would 
later put it in Marbury v. Madison,104 “[t]his original and supreme will or-
ganizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their re-
spective powers.”105 Departments articulated the fluid sovereignty of the 
people into permanent reservoirs of regular political and legal authority. 
This system organized offices into “rivalrous” groups,106 so as to keep 
each body of officials within their proper jurisdiction. Madison thus main-
tained that 
                                                                                                             
98. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not Royal Pre-
rogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1170, 1260 (2019) (describing distinction between separation and 
distribution of powers). 
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
100. M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 102-04 (2nd 
ed. 1998) (describing Montesquieu’s novel combination of the separation of powers with a scheme 
of checks and balances). 
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 347-48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 347 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
104. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). 
105. Id. at 176. 
106. Michaels, supra note 42, at 231. 
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[t]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in 
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each de-
partment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract am-
bition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional 
rights of the place.107 
 
These famous passages take on a new complexion when we bring into focus 
the departmental concepts on which they rely. Madison referred to the of-
ficials who “administer each department.” The department is thus separate 
from the particular officials who operate within it as well as the particular 
powers vested in those officials. When Madison emphasized keeping these 
departmental units “in their proper places,”108 he recognized that each de-
partment operated over a limited jurisdiction. Most importantly, reference 
to the “the constitutional rights of the place,”109 rather than the constitu-
tional rights of an officer, suggests that the department itself has legal in-
terests beyond the power exercised by its members. The official who ad-
ministered the department might abuse his power in a way that 
undermined the lasting interests of his department. He might give up his 
power to other actors or misuse it to further private rather than public 
aims. 
Madison thus emphasized the need to guard the department against 
its own occupants and leadership. To achieve that security, the constitu-
tional structure among the principal departments had been modeled on 
lower levels of government organization: 
 
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better 
motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private 
as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate dis-
tributions of power; where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the 
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other; 
that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public 
rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribu-
tion of the supreme powers of the state.110 
 
At the Philadelphia Convention, Madison had made the same parallel in 
describing how the people might guard against the danger that “those 
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charged with the public happiness might betray their trust.”111 The solution 
was to 
 
divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch and 
check each other. In this they wd. be governed by the same prudence which 
has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Govt., where all 
business liable to abuses is made to pass thro’ separate hands, the one being 
a check on the other.112 
 
He may have had in mind here the various treasury boards established un-
der the Articles of Confederation.113 That model would come up for dis-
cussion again in the legislative creation of the Department of Treasury in 
the first Congress, which is discussed in Part III. For now, however, the 
important point is that Madison envisioned both the principal departments 
established by the Constitution, and certain subordinate departments 
within the Executive, as distributing power among officers so as to prevent 
its abuse. The constitutional rights of each department would be secured 
by arranging offices within them so that no one could undermine the inter-
ests of the institution. Just as the three principal departments would divide, 
coordinate, and struggle over the exercise of power, so too the subordinate 
departments would minimize the danger of arbitrary decision-making. 
Hamilton similarly thought of the principal and subordinate depart-
ments of government in tandem.114 The “[c]onstitution of the executive de-
partment”115 would be continuous with the larger constitutional structure 
as a means of organizing and exercising power. Hamilton did not, however, 
prioritize internal coordination or checks within the executive department 
in the way Madison did. Rather, he defended the virtues of the “unity of 
the executive,” arguing that “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will 
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more emi-
nent degree, than the proceedings of any great number.”116 This conception 
of the executive branch emphasized speed and command over thorough-
ness and deliberation. However, it is worth noting that even Hamilton 
                                                                                                             
111. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1781, at 421 (Madison) (Max Far-
rand ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
112. Id. at 421-22.  
113. JOHN A. FAIRLIE, THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 93-95 (1905) (describing various versions of the “Treasury board” 
under the Articles of Confederation). 
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the 
body politic, whether legislative, executive or judiciary, but in its most usual and perhaps its most 
precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of 
the executive department.”). 
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 472-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
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recognized the importance of “stability” in the executive branch.117 He 
feared that transitions from one administration to another would “create a 
ruinous mutability in the administration of government.”118 He therefore 
initially interpreted the Appointments Clause as requiring senatorial con-
sent to removal.119 Hamilton sought both to maintain the President’s dis-
cretionary power and to ensure the executive department’s institutional 
durability.120 While he underscored the importance of a unified command 
within the executive branch, he also emphasized the need for an official 
corps whose competent members would remain beyond the President’s 
electoral term. 
C. The Text Reconsidered: Outlines of the Institutional Executive 
The previous Section demonstrated that the constitutional concept of 
the department generally meant a jurisdictionally limited organization of 
offices. The concept could be used to refer to the three constitutional 
branches as well as to subdivisions of the executive branch. In each case, 
departments served as means to distribute and channel power so as to en-
sure its responsible exercise. With this general understanding in mind, we 
can reassess the use of the term in Articles I and II. Considered on the 
whole, the Constitution’s departmental text contemplates an institution-
ally differentiated executive power that is grounded in statutory authority. 
It suggests that power ought generally to circulate through jurisdictionally 
bounded organizations of offices that inform, direct, and restrict it. But this 
broad vision leaves much about the relation between departments and 
power underdetermined. Subsequent constructions of the legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial branches would be necessary to specify the departmental 
structure of the Executive. 
As used in the Opinion Clause,121 the term “Department” plainly re-
fers to the subordinate agencies within the executive branch. The Clause 
explicitly concerns “executive Departments,” thus excluding the judicial or 
legislative departments.122 Because it refers to several departments, not 
one, the Clause must refer to the components of the executive branch ra-
ther than the branch as a whole. 
                                                                                                             
117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
118. Id. at 486. 
119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
Hamilton apparently changed his views on removal in the course of debates on the removal power 
in the first Congress, which is discussed in the next Part. GIENAPP, supra note 47, at 154-55. 
120. Jeremy D. Bailey, The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Prob-
lem of Alexander Hamilton, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453, 459-61 (2008). 
121. Again, the Opinion Clause states that the President “may require the Opinion, in 
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating 
to the Duties of their respective Offices.” U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 1. 
122. Id. 
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The normative significance of the Opinion Clause is that it affirms but 
structures the President’s discretionary powers. The Clause recognizes a 
limited presidential right of direction, by empowering him to “require the 
Opinion” of the principal officers.123 It implies that, on some matters at 
least, the President is to decide unilaterally with the non-binding advice of 
subordinate executive officials. The Clause in this way serves an “infor-
mation-gathering function” for the President.124 The performance of that 
function is only possible, however, if the principal officers are capable of 
forming and forthrightly communicating independent views to the Presi-
dent. If their written opinions could not depart from the President’s own, 
the information they communicated would have no value to the president’s 
decision-making. Opinions that merely parroted the President’s, irrespec-
tive of the merits of the issue under consideration, could only serve to ob-
scure the clear lines of public accountability which Hamilton understood 
Article II to create. 
The term department in the Opinion Clause distinguishes the duties 
of high-ranking executive branch officials. The Clause recognizes that “the 
principal Officers in each of the executive Departments” are bound by the 
“Duties of their respective Offices.”125 This indicates that principal officers 
are to operate within their own jurisdictions of law-administration, per-
forming special obligations that flow from their position as leaders of the 
organizations that administer those jurisdictions, rather than from the 
President. By referring to these discrete departmental duties, the Clause 
dispels the possibility of an undifferentiated executive, determined solely 
by the President’s powers and duties. 
Contrary to the view of some unitarians, then, the Opinion Clause 
does not “augment the unified, hierarchical executive.”126 The slight power 
to get an opinion from a subordinate would hardly “augment” a much 
greater purported power to direct subordinates’ actions. To the contrary, 
the fact that the Opinion Clause is a remnant of the proposal for a council 
of state127 implies that the Framers intended to preserve a measure of dif-
ferentiation, plurality, and deliberation within the executive branch with-
out undermining ultimate presidential responsibility or setting in 
                                                                                                             
123. Id. 
124. Tara Leigh Grove, Presidential Laws and the Missing Interpretive Theory, 168 U. 
PA. L. REV. 877, 897 (2020). 
125. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
126. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1206. See also Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 32, at 584. 
127. Thach, supra note 89, at 119; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 342-44. 
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constitutional stone a specified group of counselors.128 The Clause can in-
deed be understood to “clarify” and “exemplify” the President’s executive 
power, including his position at the apex of one of the three coordinate 
branches.129 But it at the same time acknowledges the existence of more 
particular “Duties” reposed in the principal officers, which the President 
would have to respect. The duties of the principal officers seem to be fixed 
by some authority other than the President, and tied to their departmental 
assignments. Both the Appointments Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause strengthen the inference that these duties are to be grounded in 
legislation. 
The referent of “Departments” in the Appointments Clause130 is not 
quite so textually clear as in the Opinion Clause. The Clause permits Con-
gress to vest the appointment of “inferior Officers” in “Heads of Depart-
ments” without specifying that these are the very same “executive Depart-
ments” that the Opinion Clause refers to rather than the constitutional 
branches or some other governmental institutions. The Court held in 
United States v. Germaine131 that the term department in the Opinion and 
Appointments Clauses “clearly means the same thing.”132 There has none-
theless been some scholarly dispute about whether there is a meaningful 
distinction between the “executive Departments” referred to in the Opin-
ion Clause and other departments that are not, strictly speaking, “execu-
tive,” but rather implement Congress’ enumerated powers.133 The 
                                                                                                             
128. See Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1798 (1996) 
(arguing that the Opinion Clause “advances balance insofar as it marks the checking function of a 
specified source of counsel”). 
129. Amar, supra note 57, 652, 658-59. 
130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (The President “shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”). 
131. 99 U.S. 508 (1878). 
132. Id. at 511. However, in Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), the Court seemed to 
acknowledge more ambiguity in the meaning of the Appointments Clause: “It is no doubt usual 
and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government, 
executive or judicial, or in that particular executive department to which the duties of such officers 
appertain.” Id. at 397. The problem with reading the Clause as referring both to the principal and 
subordinate departments is that it would create redundancies. The “Head” of the executive de-
partment as a whole is the President, but “the President alone” is already an alternative holder of 
appointment power under the Clause. Regardless, the Court’s uncertainty about the issue within 
a short span of time is telling. It is an artefact of a constitutional discourse that used the generic 
term “department” to refer to distinct institutions at multiple levels of the constitutional order. 
133. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, suggest that the “executive Departments” referred 
to in the Opinion Clause are those that carry out the president’s inherent executive power, 
whereas the “Department[s]” referred to in the Appointments Clause also included “nonexecu-
tive,” administrative departments as well, the latter carrying out Congress’ enumerated powers. 
Id. at 32-38. As they note, relying on the scholarship of James Hart, this reading has significant 
support in the statutes creating the first departments in 1789, which labeled both the Departments 
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Supreme Court held in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB134 that “Depart-
ment” in the context of the Appointments Clause refers to any “freestand-
ing component of the Executive Branch,” while explicitly reserving judg-
ment concerning the meaning of the term in the Opinion Clause.135 
The constitutional theory of departments recovered in the previous 
Section does not resolve these persistent ambiguities. It does, however, un-
derscore other structural implications of the Appointments Clause. First, 
the Clause gives the legislature what Madison called “partial agency in” 
the Executive, thus instituting the scheme of checks and balances.136 The 
Clause indicates that “Heads of Department” are offices “to be established 
by Law.”137 Such heads must then be appointed by the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, indicating that two of the principal, con-
stitutional departments have a role to play in creating and staffing the of-
fices which lead the subordinate departments within the Executive. It 
therefore cannot be said that these subordinate departments are solely 
governed or constituted by the President.138 
The Clause also combines executive hierarchy139 with the possibility 
of organizing departments to require coordination between officers. Con-
gress has the power to vest department heads with the appointment of “in-
ferior Officers,” or else to vest their appointment “in the President alone,” 
                                                                                                             
of Foreign Affairs and War “an Executive Department,” whereas Treasury only a “Department,” 
and termed both the Secretary of War and of Foreign Affairs “a principal officer,” whereas the 
Secretary of the Treasury was styled a “head of department.” Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 14, § 1, 1 
Stat. 28, 29; Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 49, 50; Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65, 
65; JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION 1789, at 243 (1948). Calabresi & Pra-
kash, supra note 32, at 628, argue that these distinctions are “entirely meaningless” based on the 
fact that such terms were used interchangeably in the ratification debates. It seems rather unlikely, 
however, that the phrasing of the statutes establishing the great departments would have precisely 
mapped onto the distinctions between the Opinion and Appointments Clauses purely as a matter 
of coincidence. And, given that Congress created reporting requirements for Treasury that con-
nected it more closely to the legislature, Mashaw, supra note 54, at 1285-86, the differences in 
constitutional and statutory text may indeed signal recognition of a constitutional distinction be-
tween some purely executive functions and others subject to greater congressional influence. Not-
withstanding these possibilities, the argument here does not rely on a demarcation between exec-
utive departments and non-executive departments. Styled “executive” or not, departments within 
the executive structure exercise of executive power. 
134. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
135. Id. at 511, 511 n.11. 
136. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
138. A point recognized in the unitary view of Saikrishna Prakash, Fragmented Features 
of the Constitution’s Unitary Executive, 45 WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW 702, 713-14 (2009). An 
important gap in Prakash’s analysis is the point that departmental structures may go beyond the 
creation of offices to require that the Executive follow certain procedures, in ways that may frus-
trate or change the president’s implementation of substantive legal requirements. See Part III.A, 
infra. 
139. See Metzger, supra note 50, at 1880 (arguing that the Appointments and Opinion 
Clauses, alongside the Take Care Clause, “signal[] that hierarchical supervision within the execu-
tive branch is an important structural principle”). 
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or in “the Courts of Law.” These options permit significant flexibility and 
a fairly complex organizational set-up. A simple hierarchy would be qual-
ified in cases where the law created several officers with shared responsi-
bilities or each with discrete authority over different aspects of a process.140 
In either case, one officer would not be neatly beneath another in a chain 
of command, but rather would have their own claims to authority alongside 
and equal to others over certain matters. Even more so, if inferior officers 
within an executive department were appointed by a court of law, which 
sits in a separate constitutional branch, it would not be obvious that such 
officers would be subject to direct presidential control or the command of 
a head of an executive department.141 The President’s role in appointing 
department heads assures that there is some role for hierarchy within the 
executive structure. But there might also be a place for deliberation, con-
testation, and comity, depending on how Congress elects to structure and 
empower the inferior offices within executive departments. 
The central role of Congress in structuring the Executive is the con-
cern of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Even unitary theorists 
acknowledge that the Clause broadly empowers Congress to “structure the 
executive department” as a whole by creating and organizing offices.142 As 
will be shown in Part III, Congress has acted on this power from the very 
first Congress by creating executive departments, assigning their jurisdic-
tions and powers, organizing their offices, and setting out how they are to 
operate. But the text itself is ambiguous concerning what precisely the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause refers to with the term “Department.” It is not 
immediately clear whether it refers to the three constitutional branches, to 
the subordinate departments within the Executive, or to both. 
                                                                                                             
140. The statute establishing the Treasury Department includes the latter arrangement. 
Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65, 66. That procedure and its significance are discussed at 
Part III.A, infra. The independent commission statutes, discussed in IV.A, follows the former, 
shared-agency structure, though at the level of the principal rather than inferior officers. 
141. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 661-63 (1988) (describing and ultimately 
upholding as constitutional provisions of the Ethics and Government Act providing for appoint-
ment of a Special Counsel by a “special court,” with the Special Counsel only removable by the 
Attorney General only for cause). This issue of the removability of court-appointed executive 
officers arose recently when Attorney General William Barr sought to remove U.S. Attorney 
Geoffrey S. Berman, who had been appointed to his position by the United States District Court 
of the Southern District of New York. Berman cited his appointment by the court to suggest Barr 
could not remove him. Benjamin Weiser et al., Clash Over U.S. Attorney Who Investigated 
Trump Associates Sets Off Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/06/19/nyregion/us-attorney-manhattan-trump.html [https://nyti.ms/3fFzZBh]. 
Berman shortly thereafter agreed to step down “in light of Attorney General Barr’s decision to 
respect the normal operation of law” and appoint Berman’s office’s Deputy U.S. Attorney as Act-
ing U.S. Attorney. Reuters Staff, Stand-off with Attorney General Barr ends, as New York pros-
ecutor agrees to resign, REUTERS (June 20, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-
newyork-barr-berman-idUSKBN23R0VZ [https://perma.cc/ZLB8-5FF5]. 
142. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1168. 
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The first of these possibilities has much to recommend it.143 As the 
previous Section has shown, “department” was commonly used in the 
founding period to refer to the constitutional branches. Further, interpret-
ing “Department” to refer to the three branches makes sense of this part 
of the Clause: it clarifies that Congress has the power to provide the legis-
lative means for the coordinate branches to carry out their respective con-
stitutional powers, complementing Congress’s Article III power to estab-
lish inferior courts144 with a similar power with respect to Article II.145 The 
latter power includes the authority to create subordinate departments 
within the Executive that shape how, under what conditions, and on what 
subjects the executive power may be exercised. If we instead interpret “De-
partment” in this Clause to refer to the subdivisions of the executive 
branch, it seems that we must treat this term as a “drafting error.”146 That 
is because the Constitution does not create any subordinate executive de-
partments. Powers are, by contrast, vested in the legislative, judicial, and 
executive branches. Since the Clause is coherent if we read “Department” 
to refer to the branches, we should arguably avoid interpreting the Clause 
as instead empowering Congress to implement constitutional powers 
vested in departments that the Constitution did not create.147 The legisla-
tive history of the Constitutional Convention also provides some evidence 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause was not drafted with the subordinate 
                                                                                                             
143. I am grateful to John Mikhail for helping me to think through these issues. 
144. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
145. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, make much of the distinction between Article 
III, Section 1, which vests the “judicial Power in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and Article II, Section 1, which vests 
the “executive Power” in “a President of the United States.” I do not accept but do not here chal-
lenge their conclusion that the grant of the “executive Power” to the President is necessarily ex-
clusive. Compare Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PENN. J. 
CONST. L. 323, 361 (2016). Regardless, Congress’ power to create subordinate executive institu-
tions, the procedures of which bind the discretion of any actor within them, remains comparable 
with respect to the judiciary and executive branches, irrespective of whether Congress may dis-
tribute the constitutional power of the Executive itself. 
146. Mashaw, supra note 54, at 1271 n.34. 
147. See Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1613-15 (2012) (interpretations that yield facially 
“absurd” results should be avoided). 
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executive departments in mind.148 The ambiguous use of the term depart-
ment in the founding era, however, leaves lingering uncertainty.149 
In the end, it does not matter a great deal for our purposes whether 
the Necessary and Proper Clause refers to the three principal departments 
alone, to unnamed executive departments, or to both. Under any of these 
constructions, the Clause strengthens the inference suggested by the Opin-
ion and the Appointments Clauses that Congress has the power to struc-
ture the executive branch by creating subordinate departments within it. 
Those exercises of statutory authority generate official relationships and 
procedural requirements that specify and constrain the way in which exec-
utive power is exercised. Our next task, then, is to examine how legislation, 
as well as subsequent case law and official practice, have carried the Con-
stitution’s departmental text and theory into effect. 
                                                                                                             
148. Draft IX from the Committee on Detail, where the final version of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause first appears, does not mention such subordinate departments elsewhere, but 
only refers to the “Duties of his [the president’s] Department.” 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, at 168, 172 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966); William Ewald, The Committee of 
Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 271 (2012). Draft IV, where a fragment of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause first appears, only used “departments” to refer to the “legislative executive and 
judiciary.” 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, at 138, 144 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966); Ewald, supra, at 270-71. The subordinate executive departments are mentioned in Draft 
VII, however, which says the President has a duty to “inspect the Departments of foreign Affairs 
— War — Treasury — Admiralty.” 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, at 158 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). Draft VII also refers to the president’s “Department.” Id. Since we are 
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Ewald, supra at 271, it is possible that the Necessary and Proper Clause in that draft used the term 
“department,” just like the final version that appears in Draft IX. However, it is unlikely that 
James Wilson, who composed Draft IX and gave particularly “great care” to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, would have included in that Clause a reference to subordinate departments that 
were nowhere named or even mentioned elsewhere in the same draft. Mikhail, supra note 69, at 
1047. 
149. One might read the Opinion Clause as vesting dormant constitutional powers in the 
executive departments, which Congress puts into effect when it creates those department by law. 
These constitutional powers might include all those necessary for the principal officers to fulfill 
their constitutional duty to render the President an opinion in writing on their official duties. The 
evidence for this view exists, but it is scant. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, supra note 86, at 448 (“The President . . . . will have also the advice of the executive 
officers in the different departments of the general government.”). Here, James Wilson related 
“departments” to the “government” in the same way he did in the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
But because Wilson here referred “executive officers” in these departments who advise the Pres-
ident, it is clear that he had in mind the executive departments referred to in the Opinion Clause 
of Article II rather than the three constitutional branches. But see id. at 439 (referring to the 
“mode of constituting the legislative and the executive departments of the general government”). 
In any event, if the Framers meant to say that the subordinate executive departments have consti-
tutional powers, they surely could have said so more directly and expressly. Perhaps, in keeping 
with the general purpose of this part of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Mikhail, supra note 69, 
at 1050, the term “Department” here sweeps broadly to include both the three branches and any 
subordinate departments that are found, by fair construction, to hold implied constitutional pow-
ers. 
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II. Departments in Public Law, 1789-1856 
The previous Part recovered a constitutional understanding of the de-
partment as an organization of offices that distributes power so as to tem-
per its exercise. Madison understood departmental structure to operate 
both on the level of the three branches and within the Executive.150 But 
there was also considerable indeterminacy in the constitutional text con-
cerning how the executive departments would relate to the branches and 
what constitutional role, if any, the departments would play. That indeter-
minacy is itself significant. It suggests that, while the Framers thought 
about the internal organization of the executive branch in relation to the 
overall constitutional structure, they were unable or reluctant to specify 
clearly the terms of their interaction. The Framers might have doubted 
their ability to determine the appropriate assignment of offices and rela-
tions, or had a healthy respect for the discretion of the political branches, 
or recognized unforeseen demands and challenges of the future. Intention-
ally or not, they left the specific content of executive-departmental struc-
tures, and their attendant rule-of-law values, open to future liquidation and 
construction.151 
This Part examines how the three principal departments established 
by the Constitution—the legislative, executive, and judicial departments—
created and gave normative content to the subordinate executive depart-
ments between the first Congress in 1789 and the landmark opinions of 
Attorney General Caleb Cushing in the 1850s. The branches embroidered 
the rudimentary constitutional text concerning departments into a robust 
public law of departments that included statutory law, case law, and exec-
utive branch legal interpretation. Congress’s creation of the first executive 
departments in 1789 established the longevity of these institutions beyond 
their officeholders and instituted checks and balances within some of them. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on officers’ rights and executive power 
acknowledged that binding law could emerge from within the practice of 
subordinate departments. And opinions of the Attorney General recog-
nized that the executive department had to be committed to norms of 
                                                                                                             
150. See discussion supra pp. 15-17. 
151. On liquidation, see generally William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (2019), explaining Madison’s theory that the meaning of indeterminate constitutional 
text can be “liquidated” or clarified when the constitutional branches engage in a deliberate course 
of historical practice that results in a publicly acknowledged settlement. The full set of depart-
mental norms this article develops do not all meet Baude’s test for liquidation, given that many of 
them developed piecemeal and implicitly, rather through deliberate, publicized agreement among 
the branches with public sanction. Some particular powers and obligations related to the term 
“Department” do meet the test, such as Congress’ primacy in creating departments, discussed in-
fra, at pp. 25-26, as well as, arguably, the power of departments to issue regulations binding on the 
President, discussed infra, at pp. 60-61. Others, such as the distribution of decisional authority 
among multiple officials, can be understood to fall under the broader formalist rubric of constitu-
tional construction. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that constitutional construc-
tions need not explicitly raise textual questions). 
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regularity, system, and coordinate decision-making if the President’s au-
thority over the branch were to have real effect. 
A common thread emerges from the branches’ understanding of de-
partments: exercises of discretionary power within the executive branch 
operate in, through, and against a set of norms that generally predate and 
endure beyond any particular officeholder. Departments make discretion-
ary powers operative while at the same time restraining their exercise. 
While the subordinate executive departments within the executive branch 
generate their own internal law, this law is ultimately secured by the con-
stitutional authority of the principal departments jointly to influence the 
workings of government. Because the branches shared this view of depart-
mental constraints, this history provides a “gloss” on the internal structure 
of the executive branch.152 This gloss not only confirms Congress’ broad 
authority structure the Executive through the creation of departments. 
More than this, the first hundred years of administrative law condones bu-
reaucratic forms of executive organization, denies the President unfettered 
discretion control over legal questions within the executive branch, and 
recognizes the binding force of agency regulations. 
A. “Records, Books, and Papers”: Statutory Creation of Departmental 
Constraints 
As members of the first Congress used and applied the constitutional 
text, they sought to “fix” and “construct” its meaning, generating shared 
understandings that would shape constitutional discourse and government 
moving forward.153 The legislative creation of the first departments within 
the Executive gave further content to the institutional arrangements the 
Constitution had outlined. Congress organized the executive officialdom 
to canalize each officer’s power. 
Constitutional law has largely focused on a single “decision of 1789,” 
namely the effort to clarify the President’s power to remove executive of-
ficers.154 This “decision” was supposedly made by writing the statute creat-
ing the Department of Foreign Affairs in a way that assumed the President 
had constitutional authority to remove the Secretary without the consent 
of the Senate.155 In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted 
this statute as a construction of the Constitution.156 Myers was famously 
                                                                                                             
152. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers,126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417-30 (2012). 
153. GIENAPP, supra note 47, at 1-19. 
154. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 142 (1926). 
155. Id. at 111-14. 
156. Id. at 136. 
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qualified in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,157 which held that Con-
gress could properly condition the removal of officers in agencies that per-
formed “quasi legislative” and “quasi judicial” duties.158 Most recently, in 
Seila Law v. CFPB,159 the Court reaffirmed Meyer’s interpretation of the 
decision of 1789 as recognizing the President’s general constitutional 
power to remove principal officers.160 The meaning of the decision of 1789 
nonetheless remains contested, as scholars disagree about whether the leg-
islative text and history evince any constitutional “decision” concerning 
the removal power.161 
This preoccupation with the question of removal distracts from three 
other, arguably more fundamental congressional decisions. The first was 
simply to assert authority over the creation of departments.162 The consti-
tutional text is not explicit that Congress is the branch that shall create de-
partments, though it enables Congress to vest the appointment of inferior 
officers in “Heads of Departments.”163 With its creation of the Depart-
ments of Foreign Affairs, War, and Treasury, Congress assumed preemi-
nence as the institution that structures executive power through the crea-
tion of such departments.164 This assertion also found support in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.165 As discussed in Part II, that Clause gives 
                                                                                                             
157. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
158. Id. at 629. 
159. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
160. Id. at 4. 
161. Edward Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 
27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 362 (1927) (“a mere fraction of a fraction, a minority of a minority, of the 
House, can be shown to have attributed the removal power to the President on the grounds of 
executive prerogative”), accord DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 36-41 (1997). That reading of the legislative history has been 
disputed. See Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 
(2006). But recent research by Jed Shugerman casts further doubt on the conclusion that the leg-
islative history was at all decisive on the constitutional question of removal. See Jed Handelsman 
Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789: Strategic Ambiguity and the Imaginary Unitary Executive 
(Part I) (June 22, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3596566 
[https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596566]. 
162. Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Prac-
tices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 239 (1989) (“The real decisions of 1789 are those embodied 
in the statutes establishing the ‘great departments’ of government.”). 
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
164. Casper, supra note 162, at 233 (“In the House of Representatives . . . that the prin-
ciples of the organization for the executive offices should be settled by legislation was taken for 
granted.”). 
165. In the course of debates concerning the removal power in the Department of For-
eign Affairs, representatives sometimes invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause to underscore 
Congress’s authority to structure the exercise of executive power. Representative Thomas Hartley 
argued that where the Constitution is “silent” on matters such as removal, it leaves the resolution 
of the issue to “the discretion of the legislature. If this is not the case, why was the last clause of 
the eighth section of the first article inserted? It gives power to Congress to make all laws necessary 
and proper to carry the Government into effect.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 481 (Joseph Gales ed., 
1834). Representative Richard Bland Lee argued that Congress could make a decision concerning 
the removal power because: 
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Congress authority to specify the way in which the law would be carried 
out within the executive branch.166 That power fairly implies a power to 
create subdivisions within the Executive that would allocate various func-
tions and jurisdictions and determine relations between certain executive 
officers. 
The second decision was to provide for the continuity of departments 
beyond the term of the officers who led them. The way Congress purport-
edly sought to resolve the Constitution’s ambiguity concerning the Presi-
dent’s removal power was to write the statute creating the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in manner that assumed the President held power to re-
move the Secretary.167 The statute provided: 
 
That there shall be in the said department, an inferior officer, to be ap-
pointed by the said principal officer . . . who whenever the said principal 
officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, 
or in any other case of vacancy, shall during such vacancy have the charge 
and custody of all records, books and papers appertaining to the said de-
partment.168 
 
When the President removes the principal officer, it falls to an inferior of-
ficer to hold the departmental records. Congress thus affirmed the need 
for departmental continuity in the same clause in which it arguably under-
scored the President’s powers of direction. A department would not vanish 
when the appointed secretary resigned or was removed. It would endure 
beyond the official life of the principal officer or any other person within 
the department. The department’s continuity was based on “records, book, 
and papers,” the written documents that are the stuff of modern, bureau-
cratic government.169 The files needed to be preserved in this manner 
                                                                                                             
the Constitution vests in Congress the power to make all laws necessary and proper to 
carry into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the 
United States or any officer or department thereof. . . . [T]he Constitution vests the 
power of removal, by necessary implication, in the government of the United States. 
Have not Congress, therefore, the power of making what laws they think proper to carry 
into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United 
States?  
Id. at 524. John Vining argued that Constitution granted the power of removal “either as incidental 
to the executive department, or under that clause which gives to Congress all powers necessary 
and proper to carry the Constitution into effect. This being the case, we are at liberty to construe, 
from the principles and expressions of the Constitution, where this power resides.” Id. at 512. 
166. Strauss, supra note 49, at 722 (“It is on this basis [The Necessary and Proper Clause] 
that Congress creates the detailed structures of government”); accord Calabresi & Rhodes, supra 
note 15, at 1168. 
167. For scholarly disagreement on the significance of this provision for the president’s 
constitutional power of removal, see sources cited in note 161, supra. 
168. An Act for Establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29 (1789). 
169. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 225 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, 
eds. 1968) (“[B]ureaucratic organizations, or the holders of power who make use of them . . . 
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because they represented the department’s knowledge and its history. Any 
future secretary, in carrying out the President’s policy or conducting any 
other business, would need to know what the department had done before, 
what resources it had its disposal, who its personnel were, how its offices 
were organized, and so on. In the event of removal or vacancy, this body 
of material was to be entrusted to an inferior officer. Congress thus relied 
on the subordinate officialdom as the trustee of institutional knowledge. It 
implicitly recognized that the political leadership of the department would 
come and go, and often depend upon knowledge held by lower-ranking 
officials who occupied their posts before the leaders had entered theirs. 
Congress further articulated this organizational principle with its de-
tailed structuring of the Treasury Department, which provided not only for 
a Secretary, but also an Assistant Secretary, Comptroller, Auditor, Treas-
urer, and Register.170 Here we see the collective dimension of departments, 
the fact that they assemble officers together to perform public tasks. The 
statute provided that central departmental functions relating to the disper-
sal of funds required the coordinate action of several officials.171 The 
Comptroller also had the responsibility to hear appeals from persons dis-
satisfied with the Auditor’s examination or certification of their ac-
counts.172 Madison believed these duties were “not purely of an Executive 
nature,” but instead also “partake of a Judiciary quality.”173 Congress in 
this way constituted the Treasury as an intricate set of official relationships 
that replicated within this subordinate department the checks and balances 
that existed at the level of the three branches. As Jerry Mashaw has argued, 
“[t]he independent functions of officers within the Treasury . . . seemed to 
respond to what we now recognize as ‘separation-of-functions’ protections 
within agencies to assure fairness in the adjudication of claims.”174 These 
arrangements should not be thought of only as protections for individual 
claimants, however. They also implemented a broader structural concern 
to distribute and regularize the exercise of public power. 
Congress chose to circumscribe and check discretion within the Treas-
ury in order to avoid official corruption in the exercise of one of the central 
powers of the early federal government.175 During debates in the House of 
Representatives, Madison said he 
                                                                                                             
acquire through the conduct of office a special knowledge of facts and have available a store of 
documentary material peculiar to themselves.”). 
170. An Act to establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65, 65 (1789). 
171. Id. §§ 3, 4. 
172. Id. § 5. 
173. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611-12 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
174. Mashaw, supra note 54, at 1288-89. 
175. MAX EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 206-20 (2003) (describing Treas-
ury’s role in fulfilling the Federalists’ demand for a modern fiscal state). 
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wished, in all cases of an Executive nature, that the committee should con-
sider the powers that were to be exercised, and where that power was too 
great to be trusted to an individual, proper care should be taken so to regu-
late and check the exercise, as would give indubitable security for the per-
fect preservation of the public interest, and to prevent that suspicion which 
men of integrity were ever desirous of avoiding.176 
 
Recall that in the Constitutional Convention and in the Federalist Madison 
had drawn an analogy between the importance of checks and balances in 
the “subordinate distributions of power” and in the “distribution of the 
supreme powers of the state.”177 He may have had in mind the various 
treasury boards established under the Articles of Confederation, which in-
cluded officers such as Comptroller, Treasurer, Auditor, and Register, 
alongside the head of the Board.178 Madison now successfully argued to 
revise those arrangements by parceling out specific powers among officers, 
rather than putting “the aggregate of these powers” in the hands of a 
board.179 In this way, “the offices might be so constituted as to restrain and 
check each other.”180 He emphasized “the advantages arising from energy, 
system, and responsibility” in creating a single head of the department but 
then distributing particular functions to other officers within that depart-
ment.181 
Creating such a “system” of official decision-making would align gov-
ernmental acts with the interests of the public by preventing any one actor 
from acting unilaterally or for a private purpose. This coordinate scheme 
would be formally consistent with a “chain of dependence” running up to 
the President, which Madison emphasized in congressional debates over 
the President’s removal power.182 The President could control the discre-
tion of executive officers within the bounds of law. But where the law im-
posed other constraints on how these subordinate officers related to one 
another in the performance of their respective duties, the scope of the Pres-
ident’s command authority over each of them would be limited by such 
subordinate checks. 
The decisions of 1789 thus went far beyond the question of removal. 
Congress asserted power to create separate departments within the Exec-
utive to carry out the law. Such departments could be composed of 
                                                                                                             
176. 1 ANNALS CONG. 392 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see 
also 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 421 (James Madison) (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (drawing an analogy between constitutional “plan of Govt.” and the “or-
ganiz[ation] [of] the subordinate departments of Govt.”). 
178. FAIRLIE, supra note 113, at 93-94. 
179. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 393 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 499, quoted in Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010). 
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multiple officers, and the relations between these officers could be deter-
mined by law. The departments would endure beyond the officers who led 
them, and their decision-makers were to have access to records of the de-
partment held in the hands of the subordinate officials who remained in 
place after the previous principal officer had left. The first Congress in this 
way created the scaffolding for a modern, differentiated, rule-bound, and 
knowledge-based form of government, in which power would pass through 
the hands of multiple officials and reside in departments that would outlive 
their officers. Congress did not thereby establish that any department 
must, as a matter of constitutional law, have a certain kind of organization, 
or be governed by statutory provisions that specify official relationships 
within it. Instead, Congress confirmed the more basic principle that Madi-
son had expressed in the drafting of the Constitution: statutory law could, 
and in certain spheres should, structure executive departments in such a 
way as to prevent the abuse of executive power. Where Congress created 
such structures, they attained constitutional significance as restraints 
against arbitrary rule. 
B. “A Kind of Common Law”: Law through Discretion in the Executive 
Departments 
The Supreme Court’s early jurisprudence on executive power com-
plemented Congress’ departmental construction. It subjected executive of-
ficials to legal control, but also carved out a space for discretionary deci-
sion-making in which political accountability would govern. This form of 
discretionary power, however, gave rise to its own kind of law. The direc-
tives of the President and his officers became binding within their spheres 
of authority. The executive department as a whole, and the subordinate 
departments within it, generated an internal law that converted political 
power into binding legal rights and obligations. 
The emergence of law from executive discretion began at the very or-
igins of our constitutional jurisprudence: Marbury v. Madison.183 Marbury 
is of course most well-known for the conclusion that the judiciary may re-
view and determine the constitutionality of legislative acts as an incident 
to its power to decide “Cases” and “Controversies.”184 Among scholars of 
administrative law, it is equally famous for its discussion of the reviewabil-
ity of executive acts under the prerogative writ of mandamus.185 Mandamus 
permits the courts to compel official performance of a “ministerial”186 act, 
                                                                                                             
183. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
184. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
185. E.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. 
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but denies them any right to interfere in a matter committed to the officer’s 
“executive discretion.”187 Justice Marshall explained that a “political act” 
is one “belonging to the executive department alone, for the performance 
of which, entire confidence is placed by our constitution in the supreme 
executive.”188 But Justice Marshall denied that “every act of duty, to be 
performed in any of the great departments of government, constitutes such 
a case.”189 He dismissed outright the possibility that the “heads of depart-
ments are not amendable to the laws of their country.”190Marbury in this 
way constitutes subordinate executive departments as amalgams of politi-
cal and legal responsibility, accountable vertically to the orders of principal 
officers and the President, and laterally to the principal legislative and ju-
dicial departments. 
The Court’s subsequent mandamus jurisprudence elaborated this di-
chotomy. In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,191 it held that manda-
mus would lie to compel the Postmaster General to credit a private con-
tractor as required by the Solicitor of the Treasury under the latter’s 
statutory authority to examine the accounts in question.192 The Court here 
continued to draw a binary distinction between “political duties imposed 
upon many officers in the executive department” and duties that “grow out 
of and are subject to the control of the law.”193 In Decatur v. Paulding,194 
the Court relied on the same distinction in refusing to compel the Secretary 
of the Navy to pay out a pension to Decatur, the widow of a deceased of-
ficer.195 In declining to force the Secretary’s hand, the Court recognized his 
departmental position: 
 
The head of an executive department of the government, in the administra-
tion of the various and important concerns of his office, is continually re-
quired to exercise judgment and discretion. . . . The interference of the 
Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive depart-
ments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief.196 
 
This nascent administrative law of the early nineteenth century showed re-
spect both for the discretion vested in the President and his principle offic-
ers and for the legal relations by which the Constitution and Congress had 
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marked out their power. Decatur suggested that part of the reason the 
courts would not interfere in the discretionary activities of the executive 
department was to avoid the “mischief” of disrupting orderly commands 
within the branch. The regularity of the executive department needed to 
be maintained rather than intermixed with inconsistent and sporadic inter-
ventions from a coordinate branch. Discretion was to be respected in order 
to permit its responsible and consistent exercise. 
This logic became explicit in United States v. MacDaniel,197 where the 
government sought to recover a balance charged against a clerk of the 
Navy Department.198 The clerk had contended that the government owed 
him compensation for official duties that offset the balance.199 Affirming 
judgment for the defendant clerk, the Court observed “that the duties in 
question were discharged by the defendant, under the construction given 
to the law by the [S]ecretary of the [N]avy,”200 and only thereafter had “a 
new head of the department give[n] a different construction.”201 In his re-
markable but now largely forgotten opinion for the Court,202 Justice John 
McLean concluded that the clerk was entitled to his compensation under 
the Secretary’s prior interpretation: 
 
A practical knowledge of the action of any one of the great departments of 
the government, must convince every person that the head of a department, 
in the distribution of its duties and responsibilities, is often compelled to 
exercise his discretion. He is limited in the exercise of his powers by the law; 
but it does not follow, that he must show a statutory provision for everything 
he does. No government could be administered on such principles. To at-
tempt to regulate, by law, the minute movements of every part of the com-
plicated machinery of government would evince a most unpardonable igno-
rance on the subject. Whilst the great outlines of its movements may be 
marked out, and limitations imposed on the exercise of its powers, there are 
numberless things which must be done, that can neither be anticipated nor 
defined, and which are essential to the proper action of the government. 
Hence, of necessity, usages have been established in every department of 
the government, which have become a kind of common law, and regulate 
the rights and duties of those who act within their respective limits. And no 
change of such usages can have a retrospective effect, but must be limited 
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to the future. Usage cannot alter the law, but it is evidence of the construc-
tion given to it; and must be considered binding on past transactions.203 
 
This passage is a harbinger of several fundamental aspects of administra-
tive law in the present day: the principle that an agency must follow its own 
rules, 204 the presumption against retroactivity of agency regulations,205 and 
the concept of an “internal administrative law”206 that emerges from 
agency practice. The Court begins from the observation that a head of de-
partment must exercise discretion and ends with the conclusion that the 
“usage” of the department is “a kind of common law” and is “binding on 
past transactions.”207 Law emerges from discretion, and the department 
gains increasing definition from this internal law that issues from the de-
partment’s leadership. 
Departmental structure then consisted not only in specific statutory 
requirements but also in administrative rules that had crystallized from the 
routine exercise of discretion. In United States v. Eliason,208 the Court ac-
cordingly held that army regulations issued by the Secretary of War con-
structing appropriations acts were “binding upon all within the sphere of 
[the President’s] legal and constitutional authority.”209 Similarly, in United 
States v. Bailey,210 the Court concluded that Treasury regulations could 
                                                                                                             
203. MacDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 14-15. 
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210. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238 (1835). 
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form the basis for a perjury indictment, where the regulation authorized a 
state justice of the peace to take affidavits concerning claims against the 
United States.211 These and other cases recognized the ways in which the 
discretionary power vested by law in department heads could generate 
norms with the force of law.212 The original binary distinction between legal 
duties and political discretion thus gave way to the third category: legal 
duties that originated from the exercise of executive discretion. Such duties 
specified the norms of the department that had been outlined by constitu-
tional text and statutory law. 
C. “Solidarity of Responsibility”: The Attorney General’s Constitution of 
the Executive 
This transformation of personal discretion into institutional norms 
transpired in part from the way the courts interpreted statutory law and 
executive branch practice. But it can also be seen in the internal law of the 
executive branch. Scholars have previously examined how executive de-
partments in the nineteenth century exercised their discretion, often inde-
pendent of the President,213 to interpret constitutional provisions,214 estab-
lish regular procedures for claims adjudication,215 and give “concrete 
meaning to the Constitution’s framework” governing Indian affairs.216 This 
Part examines the broader construction of the norms and relations of the 
Executive in several antebellum opinions of Attorneys General. These 
opinions have long provided early footholds for administrative law schol-
arship on the President’s power to control and supervise subordinate offic-
ers within the executive department.217 They conventionally showcase the 
alternative unitary and pluralist conceptions of executive power, which re-
spectively assert that the President has control over all official discretion 
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within the department or permit each official to exercise the discretion 
confided in her by law. These opinions reveal a more nuanced interplay 
between unitary power and departmental structure. Even those opinions 
that showcased the strongest view of the President’s control acknowledged 
an important role for coordinate action, systematic organization, and rule-
bound official conduct. When the Executive is thought of not merely as a 
power but as a department—not only as a person but as an organization of 
offices—even a devotee of the President’s prerogatives must acknowledge 
normative and practical considerations that constrain the decisional au-
thority of the President and his principal officers. 
The Attorneys General’s opinions from this period are of more than 
historical or theoretical interest. They show Attorneys General concurring 
or at least acquiescing in the legislature and judiciary’s understanding that 
statutory law governing executive departments bound the President. He 
could not act contrary to statutory duties, and statutory authority was rel-
evant to determining the scope of the President’s executive power. In ad-
dition, these opinions evince an understanding of the executive branch as 
generating its own law through the exercise of discretion and through de-
liberation between officers. Even Attorney General Caleb Cushing, the 
strongest of unitary executive theorists, constructed the Opinion Clause to 
contemplate forms of joint responsibility between the President and prin-
cipal officers. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the office of “attorney-general 
for the United States,” who was to be “learned in the law.”218 The Attorney 
General not only had the duty to prosecute suits involving the United 
States, but also to “give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when 
required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the 
heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern 
their departments.”219 This provision paralleled and augmented the Opin-
ion Clause of Article II.220 It merely mirrored that Clause insofar as it im-
posed a statutory duty on the Attorney General—corresponding to the 
President’s constitutional power—to provide his opinion to the President 
on matters concerning the Attorney General’s department. But the Act 
further provides that the Attorney General had the duty to provide his ad-
vice when “requested” by other department heads. Here were see another 
example of statutory law extending the barebones requirements of consti-
tutional text to create networks of departmental coordination. The statute 
sets up a relation of officers within the principal executive department. The 
statute assigns to the Attorney General a special role in legal interpretation 
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and practice, and expects that the President and the other heads of depart-
ment would seek out his advice on legal matters relevant to each of their 
jurisdictions. 
Much of the early law of executive power consequently took the form 
of opinions from the Attorney General. The “first great Attorney Gen-
eral,” William Wirt, who served from 1817 to 1829, 221 offered a narrow 
conception of the President’s directive authority. Wirt advised President 
Monroe that he had “no power to interfere” with a Treasury officer’s set-
tlement of accounts, where statute assigned that particular officer the per-
formance of that task: “were the President to perform it, he would not only 
be not taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he would be 
violating them himself.”222 Statutory law could divest the President of 
power to dictate or influence the decisions of subordinate officials by as-
signing duties to those officials specifically. 
Eight years later, Attorney General Roger Taney expressed nearly 
the opposite view of the President’s authority over the executive depart-
ment.223 He determined that the President had the power to order a district 
attorney to discontinue a prosecution to condemn jewels that allegedly had 
been unlawfully imported after being stolen from the Princess of Orange. 
Taney ascribed to the President a far-reaching power under the Take Care 
Clause to intervene in this case, not only on the basis of specific legal au-
thority, but also in service of such broad and uncodified values as “the in-
terest of the country” and “the purpose of justice.”224 
But Taney did not rest the argument on bare constitutional text alone. 
He understood the President’s power of command to flow from a depart-
mental relation of officers, which had been established by statute: “the act 
of May 15, 1820, which directs the district attorney to conform to the direc-
tions of the agent of the Treasury . . . shows that, in the discharge of his 
official duties, he is to be subject to the direction of the executive depart-
ment.”225 The Act Taney referred to was styled “An Act for the Better Or-
ganization of the Treasury Department.”226 It provided that the President 
would “designate an agent of the Treasury” with responsibility to “direct 
and superintend” proceedings for the recovery of chattels and monies for 
the use of the United States.227 The Act specifically obliged district attor-
neys to “conform to . . . direction and instructions” from the agent.228 Taney 
in this way relied on a statutory scheme for the organization of officers 
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within the Treasury Department to assert that the President could direct 
the district attorney. The attorney was subject to the direction of the Pres-
ident because he was subject to the direction of an official within the Treas-
ury who, by law, was to be designated by the President. This argument had 
little to do with the President’s constitutionally vested powers, instead re-
lying on the organization that statutory law imposed on the executive de-
partment. To be sure, Taney’s more forceful underlying argument was that 
the President’s constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws in-
cluded directive powers over prosecutorial duties. But this constitutional 
claim was buttressed by the more tailored statutory and departmental 
claim that Congress had structured official relations within the Treasury to 
give the President powers of direction and control over the particular of-
ficer in question. 
Taney’s more expansive, unitary view of the President’s authority 
over the executive department won out in the aftermath of Andrew Jack-
son’s war on the Second Bank of the United States.229 However, subse-
quent opinions of the Attorney General combined a broad conception of 
presidential authority with respect for regularity within the department as 
its necessary counterpart. Aspects of Wirt’s more pluralistic view then 
reentered the executive branch’s internal law. 
In 1855, President Pierce asked for the opinion (in writing) of Attor-
ney General Caleb Cushing as to whether “instructions issued by the 
Heads of Department, within their respective jurisdictions” were “valid 
and lawful, without containing express reference to the direction of the 
President.”230 The question itself is telling. First, it shows the chief execu-
tive and his officers continuing to puzzle over the proper scope of the Pres-
ident’s authority and the structure of the executive branch more than a half 
century after the Constitution was enacted. The Delphic words of the Con-
stitution on the subject of executive power left many quandaries unre-
solved, requiring the input of doctrine, historical experience, and official 
discourse to liquidate their meaning. Second, note the question’s reference 
to the principal officers’ “respective jurisdictions.” The legal discourse of 
executive power had come to embrace the jurisdictional conception of the 
subordinate departments which had animated discussions of the principal 
departments in the founding era. Each of the subordinate departments op-
erated within specific subject-matter spheres, as determined by law. And 
the question posed was whether these department heads could act on their 
own, without “express reference” to the direction of the President. 
Cushing answered in the affirmative, concluding from case law and 
executive practice that the President’s direction was generally presumed in 
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the acts of the heads of departments. He then went further, however, in 
offering a famously maximalist understanding of the unitary executive: 
 
I hold that no Head of Department can lawfully perform an official act 
against the will of the President; and that will is by the Constitution to gov-
ern the performance of all such acts. If it were not thus, Congress might by 
statute so divide and transfer the executive power as utterly to subvert the 
Government, and to change it into a parliamentary despotism, like that of 
Venice or Great Britain, with a nominal chief executive utterly powerless,—
whether under the name of Doge, or King, or President, would then be of 
little account, so far as regards the question of the maintenance of the Con-
stitution.231 
 
The position even of President Jackson had not been so expansive. His 
view, expressed in correspondence with Treasury Secretary William J. 
Duane over the removal of deposits from the Second Bank, had been that 
a principal officer could refuse to comply with the direction of the Presi-
dent, but the President then was at liberty to remove him.232 Cushing went 
a step further and determined that it would be unlawful for a principal of-
ficer to act contrary to the President’s wishes. Ensuring the unity and in-
tegrity of the executive department, as a whole, required that all executive 
officers’ acts be understood to flow from the President’s will. 
But alongside this unitary and hierarchical understanding of the Ex-
ecutive, Cushing went on to acknowledge joint forms of responsibility 
among the President and principal officers. He acknowledged that there 
would be situations where the President would rely on the written opinion 
of a secretary to act, or where the secretary and President would jointly 
reach a resolution as to what to do. In these cases, “responsibility” would 
be “shared in common” between the President and heads of department: 
 
[W]hile there is a general solidarity of responsibility for public measures . . 
. yet the weight of historical responsibility, and perhaps legal, may be 
shifted, partially from one to another, according as the determination is gov-
erned by the written direction of the President or by the written advice of 
the head of Department.233 
 
Even though the heads of the department could not lawfully act contrary 
to the President’s directive, nonetheless this did not mean that they had no 
independent agency in the formulation of executive policy. The President’s 
decision would often involve deliberation between officers, a “conference 
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and comparison of thought” to determine the best course of action.234 
Cushing, the ultimate unitary executive theorist, could not escape the dis-
cursive pull of the Opinion Clause, which presupposed principal officers’ 
power to exercise and communicate to the President an independent judg-
ment concerning their official duties.235 
The result was a paradoxical conception of presidential power in the 
executive department. The President’s will stood behind all acts within the 
branch, and heads of department were under a constitutional obligation to 
exercise their discretion in conformity with the President’s will. And yet, 
when a secretary asked for advice from the President, or the President 
from a secretary, and they jointly exercised judgment over what to do, in 
these cases official solidarity and collective responsibility arose. That kind 
of coordinate and deliberative decision-making was formally compatible 
with Cushing’s theory of the Executive because the act that issued had to 
be treated as one that the President ordered, agreed to, or otherwise ac-
quiesced in. But if responsibility for such acts was “shared” among officers 
within the executive department, “perhaps” even in a “legal” sense,236 then 
the President’s solitary will did not truly define what the executive depart-
ment was or what it did. Instead, government action became a cooperative 
endeavor where officials reasoned together about what to do. 
In a separate opinion on the Office and Duties of the Attorney Gen-
eral,237 Cushing further developed this “constitutional theory” of the exec-
utive department. At first blush, this theory strikes a note of presidential 
absolutism: 
 
That theory . . . requires unity of executive action, and of course, unity of 
executive decision, which, by the inexorable necessity of the nature of 
things, cannot be obtained by means of a plurality of persons wholly inde-
pendent one of another, without corporate conjunction, and released from 
subjection to one determining will.238 
 
The President was practically a legal dictator within the executive depart-
ment. And yet, Cushing acknowledged the limits of this principle, as artic-
ulated in the mandamus case law: “where the law has directed them to per-
form certain acts, and where the rights of individuals are dependent upon 
on those acts . . . a head of department is an officer of the law,” rather than 
a “political or confidential minister[]” of the president.239 In addition 
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because departments “are created by law” and “most of their duties may 
be prescribed by law,” Congress could “interpose by legislation concerning 
them.”240 The reach of the President’s determining will might then be quite 
limited, depending on the exactness of Congress’ legislative requirements 
and whatever decisional procedures it required. 
In what may very well be the first use of the term “administrative law” 
in U.S. legal discourse, Cushing offered as evidence for his constitutional 
theory a “series of expositions of the rule of administrative law by succes-
sive Attorneys General.”241 If the Attorney General were merely a servant 
of the President, however, these opinions concerning the scope of the Pres-
ident’s power would mean little. They would not represent an independent 
view of the President’s authority, but rather articulate the interests of the 
Attorney General’s political master. Cushing, however, did not understand 
the Attorney General as a purely executive officer in carrying out such du-
ties. When giving “his advice and opinion in questions of law to the Presi-
dent and the heads of departments . . . the action of the Attorney General 
is quasi judicial. His opinions officially define the law, in a multitude of 
cases, where his decision is in practice final and conclusive.”242 Because 
both public officers and private persons relied on the Attorney General’s 
opinions to assess their legal rights and duties, the Attorney General had 
to act impartially rather than as an advocate for the government to deter-
mine the law’s meaning and application. Cushing attested that, though the 
Judiciary Act had not made the Attorney General’s opinion binding, “the 
general practice of the Government has been to follow it in part” because 
of “the great advantage, almost necessity, of acting according to uniform 
rules of law in the management of public business: a result only attainable 
under the guidance of a single department of assumed special qualifica-
tions and official authority.”243 
Cushing thus identifies not one, but two, sources of “unity” within the 
executive department: the political direction of the President, and the legal 
direction of the Attorney General. The Office of the Attorney General re-
tains independent rights and duties, anchored in “the solemn responsibili-
ties of conscience and of legal obligation.”244 Individual Attorneys General 
do not opine against a blank slate, but rather must contend with the settled 
usage established by their predecessors.245 Those opinions might be 
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reversed, but not without argument.246 The executive department is thus 
defined as an amalgam of law and politics. If the principal department as a 
whole is unified, it is because the President adheres to the “administrative 
law” pronounced by the Office of the Attorney General, and the Attorney 
General exercises the interpretive discretion the law affords him to pre-
serve the President’s constitutional powers. Unity arises not merely from 
the President’s will but also from “order, correspondence, and combina-
tion of parts, classification of duties, in a word, system.”247 A unitary exec-
utive could only be achieved through cooperation and mutual responsive-
ness between political power and legal norms. 
Like Madison, Cushing argues that the departmental structure of the 
Constitution enjoined a systematic allocation power, both at the level of 
the three principal branches and within the subordinate departments of the 
Executive. But this allocation of power meant that legal authority would 
be vested in other actors within the branch besides the President, namely 
the Attorney General and other department heads. Cushing himself 
played a lead role in fostering this institutional development of the Execu-
tive, proposing the creation of a new law department in 1854.248 With the 
Department of Justice’s creation in 1870, vertical authority relations of su-
perior and subordinate officer came to be complimented by horizontal re-
lations among a professional corps of officers.249 The structure of decision-
making within the executive department would have to heed legal and po-
litical constraints other than the opinion of the President as to the law and 
the will of the President as to his politics. The system of the subordinate 
departments emerged as a microcosm of the constitutional structure that 
articulated and then reassembled public power. 
III. Departments in Administrative Law, 1887-2010 
Public law in the first half of the nineteenth century established a law-
bound, internally differentiated executive branch. American state building 
then took great strides during the Civil War and Reconstruction. The War 
catalyzed the growth of federal administrative capacity.250 Reconstruction 
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gave rise to a landmark welfare and regulatory agency, the Bureau of 
Freedmen, Refugees and Abandoned Lands.251 The constitutional conflict 
between President Andrew Johnson and a Radical Republican Congress 
also had implications for the future of administrative law, as Congress 
sought to limit the President’s ability to remove officers within the execu-
tive branch so as to retain legislative control over Reconstruction.252 This 
Article does not consider this period in further detail, however. The special 
legal issues raised at the intersection of the armed insurrection of the Con-
federacy, the emancipation of slaves, and the military occupation of the 
South are simply too complex and morally freighted to subsume within a 
broad study of the departmental structure of the Executive. They deserve 
separate treatment. This Part will rather pick up after Reconstruction, be-
ginning with the emergence of the modern administrative state in the late 
nineteenth century. 
Despite the major milestones of the first three quarters of the nine-
teenth century of public law, that period was a world apart from contem-
porary governance. Prior to the rapid growth of bureaucratic capacity 
around the turn of the twentieth century, federal law was implemented 
through a patchwork of authorities that supplemented but did not displace 
the central roles of extant judicial and political institutions.253 The national 
government was staffed through political patronage, relied on fee-based 
compensation,254 and was barely separated from the private realm. Such a 
government can be understood as a sort of “proto-administrative state,”255 
lacking the trappings of modern bureaucracy but laying the basis for such 
a system in the years to come. It was arguably not yet a “state” in the mod-
ern sense, since there was as yet no permanent, professional officialdom to 
represent and enact the sovereign will of a still inchoate American “pub-
lic.”256 When scholars speak of the “administrative law” of this period, 
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therefore, they are referring to a field whose existence was only dimly per-
ceived by legal actors at the time.257 By tracing this pre-history, the previ-
ous Part has shown the broader constitutional background from which 
modern administrative law emerged in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century. 
This Part turns to that body of law as it developed from the creation 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 up to early twenty-first-
century administrative law. Examining administrative law from the per-
spective of departmental norms contributes to contemporary debates in 
administrative law scholarship. Adrian Vermeule has argued that the clas-
sical constitutional framework led ineluctably to the abandonment of legal 
controls within the executive branch and its administrative apparatus.258 
But the development of internal law and the creation or subordinate 
checks within executive departments refutes this notion. Nor is it the case 
that administrative law arose out of statutory law’s whole cloth, without 
any further constitutional impetus. Instead, legal officials relied on the 
Constitution’s departmental text and structures to transform the exercise 
of executive discretion into various forms of binding law. 
That ongoing process of departmental construction has taken place 
within core doctrines of modern administrative law as it has developed 
since the Progressive Era. Over this period, the existence, importance, and 
workings of the administrative state have become a matter of prolonged 
and self-conscious legal concern. The task has been to digest and assimilate 
the expanding administrative apparatus into the preexisting constitutional 
framework, so that it could be legitimated, grasped, and delimited. This 
Article does not argue that administrative law has embraced a “fractal sep-
aration of powers,” that replicates within agencies the tri-partite scheme 
among the constitutional branches.259 Departmental principles are far 
more flexible. They order executive discretion so that its exercise exhibits 
the general, predictable, and rational features of law. Executive power at 
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once gains the force of law and becomes subject to legal evaluation and 
control.260 
This development has occurred through specific statutory enactments 
and doctrinal moves. The Supreme Court has held that the executive 
branch includes “Departments,” such as the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, that are governed by norms of expert, deliberative decision-mak-
ing and are not fully subject to the President’s political control.261 Reason-
giving requirements in the judicial review of agency action have extended 
these norms across all executive agencies, distributing authority among 
subordinate agency officials who have the necessary competence to gener-
ate such reasons.262 That assignment of roles and responsibilities is sup-
ported by the bedrock principle that administrative agencies must follow 
their own regulations.263 Even the President is bound by agency rules so 
long as they are in force.264 Together, these principles separate the admin-
istrative institutions that implement the law from the singular will of the 
political appointees who lead them. These institutions subject official acts 
to shared norms, regular procedures, and collective reasoning. 
We might understand these legal developments either as ongoing con-
structions of the Constitution’s departmental text or as working govern-
ance arrangements that make the principle of checks and balances opera-
tive within the administrative state. Both the first, formalist approach and 
second, functionalist one lead to the same conclusion: our constitutional 
order recognizes that subordinate departments secure the rule of law 
against arbitrary power. That constitutional role requires greater protec-
tion from the judiciary and other officials, as Part IV will show. 
A. Independent Commissions within the Executive Branch 
It may seem peculiar to paint administrative law as centrally con-
cerned with departments since the field has its modern origins in institu-
tions that are labeled “commissions” rather than departments.265 The com-
mission structure, however, privileged coordinate forms of decision that 
were always already present within departmental structure of the Execu-
tive, providing an institutional ballast to assertions of political will by the 
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President and his principal officers.266 This process began with Congress’ 
creation of the Inter-State Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887,267 which 
came to be seen as the paradigmatic institution of the Progressive regula-
tory state.268 By the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Supreme 
Court had recognized that such “independent” commissions were none-
theless “Departments” within the Executive in the sense of the Appoint-
ments Clause.269 The executive branch thus incorporated institutions not 
subject to political control by the President. 
The ICC was composed of a board of five commissioners, appointed 
to staggered terms, with a requirement of party balance.270 Congress origi-
nally placed the Commission in the Department of the Interior,271 but 
shortly thereafter reconstituted it as a standalone agency.272 The commis-
sioners each were appointed in the same way as a head of department.273 
This structure elevated to the apex of the Commission the coordinate au-
thority relations that Madison and Cushing had recognized as elements in-
ternal to departmental organization. Such arrangements privileged comity, 
deliberation, and reasoned decision-making above secrecy, energy and dis-
patch.274 Unlike the principal officers of the great departments created in 
1789, however, commissioners of the ICC could be removed by the Presi-
dent only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”275 
That restriction on removal affirmed that commissioners were not political 
instruments of the President, but rather experts making reasoned decisions 
on the basis of a documented record.276 
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The commission structure introduced with the ICC won explicit con-
stitutional sanction in Humphrey’s Executor,277 where the Court upheld 
similar removal restrictions on the members of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC). In doing so, the Court sought to separate the Commission 
from the President and to align it with the coordinate branches: 
 
Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an 
eye of the executive . . . to the extent that it exercises any executive function, 
as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional sense—it does 
so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi legislative or quasi judicial 
powers, or as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the gov-
ernment.278 
 
The opinion here draws on a tradition of departmental reasoning that dates 
back to the Federalist. As Madison argued, each of the principal depart-
ments exercised a core power.279 But each also exercised some portion of 
the powers located in the main in the other departments, so as to check the 
unilateral exercise of power by any one of them. The FTC’s quasi-legisla-
tive and quasi-judicial functions thus placed it within, but on the periphery 
of, the executive and in continuous dialogue with the other branches. The 
Commission was “not wholly disconnected from the executive department, 
but . . . was created by Congress . . . as an agency of the legislative and 
judicial departments.”280 
Humphrey’s Executor left the structural location of independent com-
missions ambiguous, creating the specter of a “headless ‘fourth branch’ of 
the Government.”281 The Court recognized this uncertainty in Buckley v. 
Valeo,282 stating that “Departments” within the meaning of the Appoint-
ments Clause “are themselves in the Executive Branch or at least have 
some connection with that branch.”283 It was not until the twenty-first cen-
tury, however, that the Court held that independent regulatory agencies 
were indeed “Departments” within the meaning of the Appointments 
Clause. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court held that it was unconstitu-
tional for Congress to make the members of the Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board removable only for cause by members of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, who the parties stipulated could only be 
                                                                                                             
277. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
278. Id. at 628. 
279. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 at 323 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
280. Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 630. 
281. The President’s Committee on Administrative Management, Administrative Man-
agement in the Government of the United States 32 (1937). 
282. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
283. Id. at 127. 
 
The Departmental Structure of Executive Power 
141 
removed for cause.284 The opinion was a victory for proponents of the uni-
tary executive theory, as it insisted upon the constitutional significance of 
maintaining the President’s control over the administrative apparatus 
through a “chain of command.”285 
The Court nonetheless rejected the petitioners’ argument that the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission was “not a ‘Departmen[t]’ like the ‘Ex-
ecutive departments’ (e.g., State, Treasury, Defense),” and thus that Con-
gress could not vest the Board’s appointment in the Commission.286 The 
Court held that the Commission was indeed a “Department” because that 
categorization was 
 
consistent with the common, near-contemporary definition of a ‘depart-
ment’ as a ‘separate allotment or part of business; a distinct province, in 
which a class of duties are allotted to a particular person.’ . . . Because the 
Commission is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not sub-
ordinate to or contained within any other such component, it constitutes a 
‘Departmen[t]’ for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.287 
 
In reaching this conclusion the Court adopted the reasoning of Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue,288 where he had argued that the Court should adopt the “ordinary 
meaning” of “Department[],”which did not “connote size or function 
(much less cabinet status), but separate organization—a connotation that 
still endures even in colloquial usage today (‘that is not my depart-
ment’).”289 
This holding leads to a paradoxical amalgam of hierarchical control 
and coordinate restraint that now should be familiar in executive-depart-
mental reasoning, from Hamilton and Madison, through Justice McLean 
and Cushing, and now including Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts. 
To insist that independent commissions are within the executive branch is 
also to concede that the President’s legal and practical control over the ex-
ecution of the law is not total.290 Because independent commissions are 
usually governed by a board, and because the board members are 
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removable only “for cause,” the treatment of such commissions as execu-
tive departments dissociates these departments from the will of the chief 
executive. The independent commission therefore stands as a testament to 
the distinction between the executive power and the executive department. 
Commissions are “component[s] of the Executive Branch” that the Presi-
dent may not exclusively control.291 In Part V, this Article will examine the 
latest chapter in the law of independent commissions, Seila Law,292 where 
the Court left the independent commission structure in place, while misun-
derstanding its significance. 
B. Structures of Reason-giving: Departments as Commissions 
The administrative state that took form over the twentieth century 
was not to be composed entirely of independent commissions. Far from it. 
Independent agencies like FTC and SEC stand alongside and are dwarfed 
by departments like Health and Human Services or Homeland Security.293 
The last Section has shown that courts now treat such commissions as de-
partments, assimilating them in some respects to the structure of the exec-
utive branch as a whole. This Section focuses on the other side of the coin—
that the executive departments are in many respects treated as commis-
sions. Reliance on expertise and coordinate authority have become central 
throughout the agencies that populate the executive branch, irrespective 
of their label. Our administrative state prizes reason-giving.294 The practice 
of reason-giving requires discussion and deliberation between officials ra-
ther than orders that are to be obeyed without need for justification. 
The dynamic was originally captured in the famous Morgan Cases. In 
Morgan I,295 the Supreme Court attempted to impose a requirement that 
the Secretary of Agriculture personally review the evidence in settings 
rates, rather than leave this decision to the judgment of a trial examiner 
and acting secretary. The Court famously stated that “[t]he one who de-
cides must hear.”296 This statement appealed to a judicial model of admin-
istrative decision-making, in which the Secretary would conduct trial-like 
hearings and reach his own conclusion on the basis of the evidence pre-
sented. But after several more rounds of review, the Court in Morgan IV297 
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stepped back from its close scrutiny of the agency’s internal process.298 It 
denied that it was ordinarily appropriate for the judiciary to police the kind 
and degree of attention the ultimate decision-maker had given to the issue, 
concluding that “the integrity of the administrative process must be . . . 
respected.”299 
The Court thus acknowledged the value of what Kenneth Culp Davis 
subsequently dubbed the “institutional decision,” which is a “decision 
made by an organization and not by an individual or solely by an agency 
head.”300 Institutional decisions distribute authority across multiple offi-
cials along the agency’s hierarchy, such as the initial adjudicator or exam-
iner, the person or body who hears appeals, and the person or persons who 
head the agency. The advantage of such an institutional decision is that it 
 
provides a system of internal checks and balances which is lacking when 
final decisions are made by individuals. Two minds are better than one; the 
second may catch the errors and rectify the faults of the first, as well as pro-
vide an interplay between the two that neither alone could furnish.301 
 
The institutional decision is thus the modern iteration of Madison’s system 
of subordinate checks, which was adopted in the statute creating the Treas-
ury Department. The downside of this system is that it may undermine the 
ability of private parties to gain a hearing of their concerns with the ulti-
mate decision-maker, since the official who initially adjudicates their com-
plaint does not exclusively determine the final decision.302 The personal 
method of decision-making allows for such direct interaction, but at the 
expense of broader-based input, expertise, and review. 
Modern administrative law pushes agencies in the direction of reach-
ing institutional decisions rather than decisions dictated by the agency 
head. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,303 which serves as the 
constitutional charter for the administrative state,304 diffuses authority 
throughout executive departments and thus qualifies the discretion of prin-
cipal officers. It provides for review of “final agency action,”305 and defines 
an “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United States, 
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whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency,” with 
certain exceptions.306 These authorities may be styled commissions, boards, 
traditional executive departments, or components of such departments. 
Regardless of title, the key feature of an agency, according to a leading 
commentary, is that it is “the center of gravity for the exercise of substan-
tial power against individuals.”307 The APA recognizes that statutory law 
assigns decision-making authority to many different actors in the executive 
branch, and subjects particular offices and institutions within subordinate 
departments to direct judicial control. That judicial control in turn renders 
decision-makers within departmental hierarchies accountable to norms 
other than the political dictates of superior officers in a chain of command. 
As administrative law has generalized the expectation that all agen-
cies “demonstrate an adequate reasoning process,”308 the plural decision-
making structure of commissions has gained greater traction within the tra-
ditional executive departments. The statutory and judicial demand that 
agencies adequately explain themselves encourages a separation of func-
tions and distribution of responsibilities capable of generating, applying, 
and communicating such reasons.309 The executive power of the President 
and principal officers to dictate outcomes is then constrained and informed 
by the diffusion of responsibilities within various offices and bureaus in an 
agency’s organization chart. The notion that the “Chief Executive” or the 
“Head of Department” should exercise the final word persists, but it sits 
uneasily alongside horizontal and coordinate structures of collective ac-
tion. 
Consider, for example the APA’s requirement that formal adjudica-
tory decisions be supported by “substantial evidence,”310 a standard origi-
nating in judicial review of the Interstate Commerce Commission.311 In 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,312 the Court interpreted this to mean 
that the courts should take into account “the record as a whole,” including 
the findings of the agency’s initial decision-maker.313 Given this standard 
of review, as well as the practical challenge of reassessing the merits of 
every initial decision, agency heads face significant costs in rendering deci-
sions contrary to their initial adjudicators. Authority is consequently 
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shared between the lower-ranking official who hears the case and the 
agency head who has ultimate responsibility for the decision. To be sure, 
such systems of administrative adjudication may generate serious and sys-
temic inaccuracies that existing quality control efforts have failed to mas-
ter.314 The point is not that the system guarantees correct results. Instead, 
the point is that a system that requires the agency to supply a reason will 
tend to allocate authority between several officials within the agency who 
offer, assess, and potentially reassess those reasons. 
The APA’s “arbitrary” or “capricious” standard for informal rule-
making and adjudication creates similar incentives.315 In Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe,316 the Court interpreted the APA’s judicial 
review provisions to require that review “be based on the full administra-
tive record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his deci-
sion.”317 The agency cannot rely on “‘post hoc’ rationalizations.”318 Review 
based on the preexisting record requires such records to be made and 
maintained, and disclose information that supports the decision.319 The ul-
timate decision-maker is unlikely to make and compile the record person-
ally given that such a process is time and resource intensive as well as below 
her paygrade.320 Instead, these tasks will require the input of many other 
officials within the agency who can bring relevant scientific and policy 
knowledge to bear.321 
Overton Park requires that review of the record under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard must be “searching and careful” but “narrow.”322 
In a series of cases, the Court and the D.C. Circuit have elaborated this 
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standard into a robust reason-giving requirement.323 This “hard look” re-
view requires relatively intense scrutiny of the agency’s reasoning pro-
cess.324 Drawing a “rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made”325 will require a division of labor among agency officials in 
which relevant information can be marshalled, analyzed, and composed to 
determine and justify a course of action. Arbitrariness review remains def-
erential to agency expertise and policy judgment.326 But even in cases 
where courts exercise a relatively soft touch in reviewing the decision, rea-
soning from lower-level officials may be necessary to shore up an otherwise 
shaky record.327 “Staff reports” sometimes become a focal point for review, 
as challengers will criticize the underlying data generated and inferences 
made by the subordinates.328 Judicial review in this way empowers various 
professionals within the agency: the lawyers who have the special compe-
tency to interpret the text, structure, and purpose of the statute; scientists 
and engineers who can set forth feasible courses of action; and economists 
who can assess the impact of regulatory alternatives on social welfare.329 
Operating under the shadow of judicial review, these professionals engage 
in a “dialogue inside the agency.”330 
Regulations, then, do not usually spring like Athena from the head of 
department. They arise from the input of multiple offices within as well as 
without the agency.331 Many regulatory proposals are drafted by a “‘team’ 
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or ‘work group’ composed of representatives from all the agency subunits 
that have an interest in the outcome of the rulemaking process.”332 Draft 
rules generally go through agencies’ “internal clearance process,” which is 
often “quite contentious, as different units within the same agency can 
have a stake in the policy and very different take on how it should look.”333 
An agency may assign each office that plays a part in drafting a rule a 
“unique area[] of responsibility” with respect to certain legal or policy is-
sues, thus requiring that each office’s concerns within its jurisdiction be 
taken seriously.334 The rule, to borrow Madison’s phrase, “pass[es] thro’ 
separate hands”335 of many officials within an agency before it is presented 
to the one who possesses the formal statutory authority to propose and 
finalize it. 
This internal structure can empower the head by helping to gather and 
process information about the costs and benefits of various alternatives as 
well as political and legal obstacles.336 Agency heads typically coordinate 
offices and functions within their agencies so as to fulfill their own political 
purposes and official duties, attempting to decrease the information costs 
of their decisions. These efficiency gains cost the head some leeway, how-
ever. Once the head puts a procedure in place, she creates legitimate ex-
pectations that she will not remove it arbitrarily or ignore the information 
it generates. 
This cost to the head’s discretion in turn is a benefit to the durable 
rules and practices that constitute the department. The departmental in-
frastructure outlined in statute gains increasing solidity as power flows 
through its channels. This structure subjects the head’s decisions to the in-
put of subordinates who operate under norms and incentives peculiar to 
their own position within the institution and the professional norms that 
attach to those roles. In some cases, the department head’s failure to re-
spect existing processes and staff jurisdiction has rendered agency action 
                                                                                                             
(July 2000), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/FHWARulemaking%20Man-
ual.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TQP-NZJL]. 
332. Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory Agency 
Rulemaking, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 (1998); see also Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher 
& Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for 
Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 491-501 (2012). 
333. RACHEL AUGUSTINE POTTER, BENDING THE RULES: PROCEDURAL POLITICKING 
IN THE BUREAUCRACY 33 (2019). 
334. BLAKE EMERSON & CHERYL BLAKE, PLAIN LANGUAGE IN REGULATORY 
DRAFTING, REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 26-27 
(Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Plain%20Regula-
tory%20Drafting_Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG7Q-LULV]. 
335. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 421 (James Madison) (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
336. Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 451-72 (2015). 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:90, 2021 
148 
unlawful.337 More routinely, subordinate checks are likely to act as a gentle 
but persistent restraint on decisions that go against the information and 
norms held within the lower ranks of the agency. 
The complexity of the modern executive branch is such that inter-de-
partmental distributions of authority operate alongside these intra-depart-
mental checks. Agencies sometimes share authority over adjudication,338 
rulemaking,339 and myriad other administrative functions. They must work 
together when their responsibilities and powers impinge on one another 
and “overlap.”340 These inter-agency arrangements may be fairly “cooper-
ativ[e],”341 with the relevant agencies seeking a mutually agreed upon so-
lution or distribution of responsibilities.342 At other times they become 
“adversarial,”343 as when agencies sharply disagree over who has authority 
on a given issue or how a shared authority ought to be deployed.344 In ei-
ther case, the diffusion of authority across multiple departments provides 
a partial surrogate for the separation of powers among the branches. As 
James Wilson observed in his discussion of the constitutional separation of 
powers, “there ought to be a mutual dependency, as well as a mutual inde-
pendency. . . . [T]he proceedings of each . . . are liable to be examined and 
controlled by one or both of the others.”345 This amalgam of dependency 
and independence operates at the agency level too, as multiple actors must 
sign off on decisions over which they have concurrent jurisdiction, or else 
resort to a third-party, such as another agency, the White House, or the 
courts, to resolve the dispute.346 While such arrangements are likely to im-
pose significant costs in taking action, they can ensure that multiple 
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interests and viewpoints are considered, and check the exercise of power 
by any one institution to prevent abuse.347 The executive branch, in other 
words, includes its own internal, subordinate checks in which power is par-
tially distributed and partially shared. 
We cannot say, however, that the distribution of power within the ad-
ministrative state is truly “isomorphi[c]” with the separation of powers be-
tween the branches, neatly replicating Montesquieu’s tripartite scheme.348 
That is in part because the executive branch is headed by a President, ra-
ther than by a plural body that would mirror the plurality of the sovereign 
people. As Wilson himself argued, in accord with Hamilton, “[t]he execu-
tive power, in order to be restrained, should be one,”349 allowing the public 
to control the execution of the law by their selection of a single responsible 
President. The administrative state has thus come to combine unitary, hi-
erarchical, political control by the President with the subordinate checks 
provided by departmental organization, norms, and responsibilities. The 
rise of “presidential administration” as a theory and practice of govern-
ment has enhanced the authority of politically accountable leaders to dic-
tate outcomes within and across the subordinate departments.350 Regula-
tory review at the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, in 
particular, asserts political ownership, accountability, and influence over 
agency policy.351 The President or his subordinates sometimes also rely on 
the unity of the executive branch under the Chief’s auspices to “pool” pow-
ers vested in particular agencies.352 These moves reduce the influence of 
departmental decision-making strictures and may enhance the significance 
of uncodified political considerations. 
The landmark case of late twentieth-century administrative law, 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,353 is representative 
of this uneasy combination of political and bureaucratic discourses in law’s 
administration. There the Court justified deference to agencies’ 
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“reasonable” interpretations of statutory ambiguities, first, on the ground 
that “the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency consid-
ered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision in-
volves reconciling conflicting policies.”354 But the Court went on to note 
that the 
 
agency . . . may . . . properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views 
of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly ac-
countable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropri-
ate for this political branch of the Government to make such . . . choices.355 
 
On the one hand, the judiciary defers to the agency to the extent that it 
offers a “detailed and reasoned” explanation for its resolution of difficult 
technical and policy questions. On the other hand, the judiciary defers to 
the agency on the grounds that the agency has made a political decision 
under the direction of the President, who is “accountable to the people.” 
The former rationale is departmental, relying on the capacity of the agency 
as an institutional decision-maker to digest information, deliberate, and is-
sue a reasoned judgment. The latter rationale is about discretionary polit-
ical power and electoral accountability. 
There is no logically necessary incompatibility between decisions mo-
tivated by presidential directive and those informed by the deliberation of 
subordinates.356 In principle, departmental structure might complement 
presidential authority. The President could fulfill his constitutional “duty 
to supervise” law-administration, not by micromanaging agency decisions 
for relatively short-term political payoffs, but instead by maintaining and 
improving systems of agency management that enable presidential policy 
implementation.357 Decisions ideally would be vetted by the knowledge 
subordinates communicate and the norms and values that inhere in their 
official roles. But there is no guaranteed alignment between these two 
value-systems. Presidents may and often do fail to see that their policy 
goals are likely to be implemented, not by imposing centralized political 
control over agencies, but rather by fostering institutional competence, 
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information sharing, and a sense of trust between careerists and appoin-
tees.358 
Whether the Executive achieves workable integration between its 
powers and its departments depends on whether the hierarchical structure 
of political direction is adequately sensitive to input from subordinates, 
and whether the institutional decision-making process is duly responsive 
to the political judgments of agency leadership. In the balance of forces 
within state and civil society, political control gets the benefit of the Presi-
dent’s unique claim to represent “the will of the public as a whole.”359 Sub-
ordinate checks, on the other hand, depend on a number of contingent fac-
tors, such as: the procedures Congress imposes, the internal law agencies 
generate, the judiciary’s defense of these rules when political officials de-
viate from them, and the President and principal officers’ willingness to 
exercise enlightened self-restraint. 
C. An Agency Must Follow Its Own Rules: Departmental Constraints on 
Principal Officers and Presidents 
The law of public officers in the nineteenth century recognized that 
departmental regulations were “binding upon all within the sphere” of the 
President’s constitutional authority.360 They could serve as a “kind of com-
mon law.”361 Those cases tied the binding force of regulations to depart-
mental structure, which required principal officers to control their depart-
ment but at the same time required this control to be exercised in a regular 
and consistent fashion. Similarly, opinions of the Attorney General acted 
as an internal law of the executive branch, thus complicating the unitary 
picture of discretionary control by the President. In the twentieth century, 
administrative law confirmed and strengthened these principles. The Pres-
ident himself may not act contrary to a rule promulgated by one of the 
heads of departments so long as that rule remains in force. The constitu-
tional structure of the executive department then checks the President’s 
executive power. 
It is a foundational and uncontroversial principle of administrative 
law that an agency must generally follow its own rules.362 As noted in Part 
III, this principle has antecedents in the nineteenth-century law of 
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officers.363 But the contemporary foundations are Arizona Grocery v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.364 and United States ex rel. Accardi 
v. Shaughnessy.365 Arizona Grocery held that the ICC could not “retroac-
tively” repeal a rate prescription that had been made in its “quasi legisla-
tive capacity” through an exercise of its “quasi judicial” function.366 This 
holding was grounded in the Court’s observation that, when the Commis-
sion prescribes rates, it “speaks as the Legislature, and its pronouncement 
has the force of statute.”367 It is noteworthy that the opinion enforces dif-
ferentiation between agency proceedings. It does not treat the Commission 
as a black box, but rather distinguishes different fora where various kinds 
of powers can be exercised. Arizona Grocery displays a departmental logic 
that treats agencies as articulated institutions rather than as personal, dis-
cretionary agents. 
Likewise, in Accardi, the Court understood internal departmental 
structures to constrain department heads’ conduct. It held that the Attor-
ney General had violated regulations of the Department of Justice by an-
nouncing the deportation of the petitioner before the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) had ruled on his case.368 The Court observed that 
“[r]egulations with the force and effect of law supplement” the statutory 
requirements for suspension of deportation, requiring “decisions at three 
separate administrative levels below the Attorney General.”369 These reg-
ulations conferred on the BIA the “discretion and power conferred on the 
Attorney General by law,” making the Board’s decision final unless re-
viewed by the Attorney General.370 Based on these procedural regulations, 
the Court concluded: 
 
The clear import of broad provisions for a final review by the Attorney 
General himself would be meaningless if the Board were not expected to 
render a decision in accord with its own collective belief. In unequivocal 
terms the regulations delegate to the Board discretionary authority as broad 
as the statute confers on the Attorney General; the scope of the Attorney 
General’s discretion became the yardstick of the Board’s. And if the word 
“discretion” means anything in a statutory or administrative grant of power, 
it means that the recipient must exercise his authority according to his own 
understanding and conscience. This applies with equal force to the Board 
and the Attorney General. In short, as long as the regulations remain 
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operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the 
Board or dictate its decision in any manner.371 
 
In order to credit the Attorney General’s statutory authority over depor-
tation decisions, the Court had to give full effect to the Attorney General’s 
regulations concerning the delegation of that authority. The Board had to 
make a decision “in accord with its own collective belief” because the At-
torney General had vested them with his authority to act on his own be-
lief.372 
The personal dictate of the officer in this way becomes the collective 
judgment of a group, and flexible discretion hardens into organizational 
routine. As Thomas Merrill puts it, “under Accardi, officials exercise dis-
cretion in such a way as to bind themselves.”373 The importance of this prin-
ciple is not only that it binds the issuing official or office but that regula-
tions can empower other, subordinate officers within a department to 
exercise independent judgment. Accardi erects walls inside the agency. If 
a regulation has the force of law, that means that subordinates who are 
empowered by the regulation may rely on it to resist contrary commands 
of their principals. 
Despite Accardi’s central place in administrative law, scholarly com-
mentary remains uncertain about its legal basis and justification. Some of 
the case law suggests that the principle is rooted in due process.374 Merrill 
argues that Accardi follows from the legislative nature of the agency’s ac-
tion, which makes it binding on all, including the agency itself.375 Elizabeth 
Magill provides a positive explanation, suggesting that Accardi enables 
agencies to “credibly commit” to policy positions, thus increasing the like-
lihood of private compliance with the policy.376 Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule argue that the doctrine is “rooted in ambient thinking about the 
internal morality of law . . . which forbids ‘a failure of congruence between 
the rules as announced and their actual administration.’”377 
In contrast to these perspectives, this Article grounds Accardi in the 
departmental structure created by Article II. While departments are gov-
erned by their principal officers, they have an existence independent from 
the will of those officers. They are constituted by stable rules and the pat-
terns of official relationships those rules maintain. Accardi constructs the 
constitutional principle that departments are separable from their heads 
by denying that the will of the head is always dispositive of what officers 
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within the department must do. This is not to deny that Accardi facilitates 
credible commitment, furthers rule-of-law values, honors quasi-legislative 
delegations from Congress, and at least sometimes promotes due process. 
But these advantages are not merely “ambient,” or grafted on by judicial 
lawmaking. They instead flow from the longstanding departmental norms 
of public law, which treat the organization and processes of the executive 
branch as providing genuine legal constraints on political leadership. The 
relevant norms are not borrowed from judicial and legislative values that 
are otherwise foreign to the executive branch. They are rather internal to 
what the execution of law itself requires under our administrative consti-
tution. 
These constraints apply not only to the principal officers in the subor-
dinate executive departments, but also to the President himself. In United 
States v. Nixon,378 the Court affirmed denial of the President’s motion to 
quash a subpoena of White House tapes by the Special Prosecutor, issued 
under the authority of regulations issued by the Attorney General. The 
Court held that the regulations were legally binding, even on the President: 
“So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound 
by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the three 
branches is bound to respect and to enforce it.”379 The District Court for 
the District of Columbia had previously concluded that it had been unlaw-
ful for the Attorney General to fire the Special Prosecutor without the 
finding of “extraordinary impropriety” required by the regulation.380 The 
Supreme Court now held that those same regulations were binding on the 
President’s conduct. The regulations thus reallocated decisional authority 
from the President and his principal officer to subordinate officials. The 
will of the President could not defeat the regular norms of executive de-
partments. 
Enthusiasts for unitary executive power tend to think United States v. 
Nixon rested on bad reasoning. On Akhil Amar’s view, “separation of 
powers militated against judicial intervention in an essentially intra-execu-
tive dispute. Given that [the Special Prosecutor] was Nixon’s subordinate, 
wasn’t the case, in essence, Nixon (inferior) vs. Nixon (real)?”381 This Ar-
ticle has shown that this is the wrong way to think about the constitutional 
structure of the executive branch. Our constitutional tradition teaches that 
the executive power is constrained by the rules that constitute the execu-
tive departments. Nixon might instruct the Attorney General to change the 
regulations governing the Special Counsel and remove the Attorney 
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General if he did not comply. But he could not act contrary to the rules 
while they were on the books. Otherwise regulations would not have the 
force of law. They would be subject to unilateral presidential suspension. 
A presidential power to act contrary to regulation would undermine the 
system of subordinate checks which Madison envisioned and which the 
subsequent development of public law has put in place. By requiring the 
President to effectuate the rescission of a regulation before he can act con-
trary to it, departmental norms restrain and publicize the exercise of exec-
utive power. 
The end of Nixon’s presidency itself has constitutional significance. 
United States v. Nixon contributed to his resignation, yielding evidence 
that Congress considered in drawing up articles of impeachment.382 His exit 
in disgrace ought to be, and has been, understood as an executive acquies-
cence in the departmental constraints Congress, the Courts, and the Justice 
Department itself had imposed. After Nixon, at least up until the tenure of 
William Barr,383 there has been a strong norm of “prosecutorial independ-
ence from the President” endorsed by Attorneys’ General and by the Sen-
ate that has confirmed them.384 That norm is grounded in the departmental 
structure of executive power, which separates the institutions of govern-
ment from the will of the President. This distinction requires renewed pro-
tection. 
IV. Departmental Norms in Relief 
The previous parts have mapped the departmental structure that stat-
utes, case law, and executive branch interpretations have built on the scaf-
folding of the Constitution’s text. This Part will show how this structure has 
been challenged during the Trump Administration and argue for its rein-
forcement. 
Departmental structure has been tested by personalistic understand-
ings of the Executive. At least since the Reagan Era, unitary theorists of 
the Executive have resisted any constraint on the President’s authority to 
                                                                                                             
382. Fred H. Altshuler, Comparing the Nixon and Clinton Impeachments, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 745, 749 (2000). William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States 
v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 130 (1974). 
383.  See William P. Barr, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks by Attorney 
General William P. Barr at Hillsdale College Constitution Day Event (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-attorney-general-william-p-barr-hillsdale-college-
constitution-day-event [https://perma.cc/YB3L-PNQ7] (arguing for political control over prosecu-
torial decisions); Susan Hennessey & Benjamin Wittes, What Bill Barr Said and What It Means, 
LAWFARE (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-bill-barr-said-and-what-it-means 
[https://perma.cc/7FHA-V4JX] (describing speech as “a defense of Barr’s politicization of the de-
partment’s work,” including his effort “to serve Trump’s personal and political interests in attack-
ing investigations of himself”).  
384.  Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of 
Justice, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2018). 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:90, 2021 
156 
administer the law.385 They deny that Congress has power to condition the 
removal of officials on good cause and maintain that the President may 
command any official as to how she is to exercise her discretion.386 
President Trump has taken this view to the indefensible extreme, as-
serting that “I have the right to do whatever I want as President.”387 But 
less extreme personalistic understandings of the presidency were already 
in circulation in previous administrations, including those of Presidents 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Political appointees in the Bush Ad-
ministration were notorious for undermining, interfering with, and sup-
pressing the judgment of staff scientists at agencies like the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Food and Drug 
Administration.388 The political leadership of the Civil Rights Division of 
the Department of Justice under President Bush likewise broke from 
longstanding departmental norms in rejecting career officials’ recommen-
dations regarding pre-clearance under the Voting Rights Act, and also by 
unlawfully considering political ideology in certain appointment deci-
sions.389 
The Obama Administration in some instances also undermined inde-
pendent departmental judgments and concentrated authority in the White 
House and in political appointees. Consider the administration’s decision 
in implementing the Affordable Care Act to use a permanent appropria-
tion for tax refunds to fund cost-sharing payments to health insurers.390 Ca-
reer civil servants initially concluded that the appropriation could not be 
used in this way, but were overruled by White House officials and their 
departments’ leadership.391 In this case, the failure to adhere to the inde-
pendent judgment of legal officials within the relevant departments argua-
bly undermined adherence to statutory requirements.392 Obama’s presi-
dentialism seems also to have further deformalized the administrative 
                                                                                                             
385. Skowronek, supra note 266, at 2075-6. 
386. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 32, at 597. 
387. Michael Bryce-Saddler, While bemoaning Mueller probe, Trump falsely says the 
Constitution gives him ‘the right to do whatever I want’, WASH. POST (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens-
constitution-gives-him-right-do-whatever-i-want/ [https://perma.cc/B5LR-Z6E5]. 
388. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Science: Regulatory Science after the 
Bush Administration, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31 (2009). 
389. Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 607, 645-47 (2009). 
390. Matthew B. Lawrence, Disappropriation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (2020); HOUSE 
COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE (MAJORITY STAFF) & HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS 
(MAJORITY STAFF), JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT INTO THE SOURCE OF 
FUNDING FOR THE ACA’S COST SHARING REDUCTION PROGRAM, at 51-52 (2016). 
391. Joshua Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 398, 434-40 
(2019). 
392. See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care 
Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1732-35 (2016). 
 
The Departmental Structure of Executive Power 
157 
state. White House review of environmental regulations was often “ad hoc 
and chaotic rather than predictable and ordered.”393 Numerous “czars” co-
ordinated policy from the White House outside of the ordinary depart-
mental structures, thus “mak[ing] presidential influence over agencies 
opaque to political accountability and legal controls.”394 
While such presidentialism has been a bipartisan creation, the Trump 
Administration has rapidly accelerated the destruction of departmental 
norms in service of maximal political discretion. In one strikingly symbolic 
case, then-Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt 
unlawfully constructed a “soundproof privacy booth”395 in his government 
office to “deter eavesdroppers.”396 Hostility towards administrative legal-
ity has been far more than symbolic, however. President Trump has re-
moved several Inspectors General who police executive branch conduct.397 
In its effort to end temporary protected status for Haitian immigrants, the 
Trump Administration’s Department of Homeland Security “departed 
from past agency practices without explanation and was improperly influ-
enced by the White House.”398 The response to the Covid-19 pandemic has 
seen frequent “friction” and “sparring” between the White House and the 
medical professionals at the Centers for Disease Control, undermining 
confidence in data integrity.399 A recent executive order aims to remove 
civil service protections for administrative officials who exercise policy-
making functions, thus subjecting them to the president’s political 
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directive.400 In these and many other cases,401 the President and his heads 
of department have relied on their political discretion to undermine sub-
ordinate officials whose authority is rooted in disciplinary knowledge and 
professional standards. 
This Part will consider in greater detail three relatively recent exam-
ples in which departmental norms have been put under strain: the Census 
Case, challenges to the leadership structure of Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, and the Special Counsel investigation into Russian interfer-
ence in the 2016 election. These cases underscore the importance of de-
partmental structure, as well its under-enforcement by today’s judicial, 
executive, and legislative officials. The cases show that departmental 
norms are not self-executing or inherently resistant to hierarchical control. 
It is in the nature of both constitutional constructions and functional-con-
stitution arrangements that they are open to revision, to fortification or 
erosion, depending on how legal actors understand and apply the indeter-
minate provisions and values of the Constitution in the present.402 The 
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normative content of departments arises not from crystal clear textual re-
quirements but from a cluster of legal rules, interpretations, and under-
standings that have accreted among the branches over time. As a conse-
quence, legal officials have agency and responsibility in the present to 
preserve departmental norms and the underlying rule-of-law values they 
serve. Departments only serve to check and temper the exercise of execu-
tive power if the officials who safeguard them, both within and without the 
Executive, recognize the distinction between the constitutional interests of 
the President and his appointees, on the one hand, and the “constitutional 
rights of the place[s]” that they superintend, on the other.403 These case 
studies show that this distinction between departments and power is fray-
ing, and offer some ways in which it might be reinforced. 
A. The Census Case 
In Department of Commerce v. New York,404 the Court set aside Sec-
retary of Commerce Wilbur Ross’ decision to add a citizenship question to 
the decennial census. With different majorities signing on to separate parts 
of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, the Court concluded that, while the Sec-
retary’s decision was supported by sufficient evidence in the administrative 
record, the explanation given was pretextual. Both aspects of the holding 
engage questions of departmental structure. However, unlike Judge Fur-
man’s opinion in the district court below,405 Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion 
failed to adequately safeguard the integrity of agency decision-making pro-
cesses. The case would have been a welcome opportunity for the Court to 
apply the Accardi doctrine and require agency leadership to give due con-
sideration to the viewpoints of subordinate officials within their depart-
ment. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts largely hewed to a personalistic un-
derstanding of the Commerce Secretary’s discretion that disregarded both 
the formal rules of the Secretary’s department and the functional con-
straints that reasoned deliberation ought to have imposed on the Secre-
tary’s reasoning. 
The district court below had held that the Secretary’s decision was in-
valid because it violated the Census Act, was arbitrary and capricious, and 
rested on a pretextual justification.406 The conclusion that the decision was 
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arbitrary and capricious rested on several foundations, but for our pur-
poses two are of primary interest. First, Judge Furman found that the 
stated basis for the decision ran “counter to the evidence” before the Sec-
retary.407 Secretary Ross asserted that there was no evidence the citizen-
ship question would “materially decrease response rates.”408 Judge Furman 
found, to the contrary, that “[t]he Administrative Record is rife with both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence, from the Census Bureau itself, 
demonstrating that the addition of a citizenship question to the census 
questionnaire would indeed materially reduce response rates among immi-
grant and Hispanic households.”409 Factual findings from Census Bureau 
staff were cornerstones of the record that contradicted the Secretary’s de-
cision.410 By taking the Bureau’s conclusions seriously, Judge Furman hon-
ored the departmental value of reason-giving, which distributes authority 
within an agency between the ultimate decision-maker and subordinates 
who inform and ought to discipline the decision-maker’s judgment. 
The district court also found that the decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious because the Secretary had violated both the Office of Management 
and Budget’s (OMB) Statistical Policy Directives and the Census Bureau’s 
Statistical Quality Standards by not conducting pre-testing of the citizen-
ship question.411 The government had argued that the Bureau’s statistical 
standards “are not binding on the Secretary himself,”412 relying on a D.C. 
Circuit holding that “that an agency is not bound by the actions of its staff 
if the agency has not endorsed those actions.”413 Relying in part on United 
States v. Nixon, Judge Furman first noted that the government had 
acknowledged that the OMB Directives were binding.414 He then observed 
that the Bureau’s own standards “were the product of a formal rule-mak-
ing type process” and “have been ‘endorsed’ by the Commerce Depart-
ment, as demonstrated by the consistent adherence to them until Secretary 
Ross’s decision.”415 Consequently, they likely were binding on the Secre-
tary. In addition, these standards were “consistent with the standards pre-
vailing in the fields of survey design and administration” and “therefore 
are independently relevant to the analysis of whether his decision was sub-
stantively reasonable as the APA requires.”416 This aspect of the district 
court’s ruling recognized the way in which the overall structures of the 
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executive department, including OMB regulations, could bind the conduct 
of the Secretary. The Census Bureau’s own standards, consistently adhered 
to by secretaries over time, could generate what Justice McLean in Mac-
Daniel had called “a kind of common law”417 within the subordinate de-
partment. The Secretary was thus constrained on every side by depart-
mental norms. 
The Supreme Court did not follow the district court in these aspects 
of its arbitrary and capricious analysis, though it affirmed the district 
court’s conclusion that the Secretary’s decision had been pretextual. A ma-
jority of the Court agreed with Chief Justice Roberts’ conclusion that the 
Secretary’s judgment reasonably weighed the Bureau’s “inconclusive” 
analysis against “the value of obtaining more complete and accurate citi-
zenship data.”418 The Justices in the minority on this question agreed with 
the district court below that the Secretary’s explanation was unsupported 
by the record.419 Justice Breyer concluded that Ross could point to “noth-
ing significant”420 to rebut the Bureau’s conclusion that asking the question 
would lower the response rate and “no evidence”421 to counter the Bu-
reau’s finding that asking the question would lead to less accurate citizen-
ship data. 
Leaving aside the merits of this dispute for the moment, note that both 
the majority and the dissenters all acknowledged that the Secretary was 
compelled by law to engage to some extent with the reasoning and con-
cerns from subordinates within his department in justifying his decisions. 
Chief Justice Roberts did not deny that the Secretary was “required to con-
sider the evidence and give reasons for his chosen course of action.”422 The 
bedrock administrative law principles of reasoned decision-making and re-
view on the record obliged the official with statutory discretion to respond 
to the input of lower ranking officials with knowledge about the subject-
matter of his action. Had the Secretary’s explanation altogether ignored 
the express findings of Bureau officials, that would presumably have failed 
even Chief Justice Roberts’ paper-thin review of the Secretary’s decision. 
Despite this formal acknowledgment that a modicum of engagement 
with the reasoning of subordinates was necessary, however, Chief Justice 
Roberts failed to accord that departmental structure the respect it de-
served. His opinion here, like his opinion in Free Enterprise Fund,423 
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ribbed the Bureau’s “bureaucratese”424 and portrayed Justice Breyer dis-
senting opinion as “subordinating the Secretary’s policymaking discretion 
to the Bureau’s technocratic expertise.”425 There is no doubt that Justice 
Breyer was willing to take a fairly hard look at the Secretary’s reasoning. 
But his opinion and the district court’s ably and exhaustively demonstrated 
that the Secretary simply had no basis in the record, other than generalized 
uncertainty, for choosing to ask the citizenship question rather than rely 
only on administrative records. It would have been one thing if the magni-
tude of harm to the census response rate was unknown, but nonetheless a 
citizenship question would generate useful data for the Secretary’s pur-
ported purpose of enforcing the Voting Rights Act. However, there was no 
such benefit side of the ledger that Ross could point to beyond his own say 
so.426 The information put forward by subordinates roundly contradicted 
him.427 
One can understand the Chief Justice’s worry about “technocratic ex-
pertise” gaining the upper hand over the “value-laden” judgment of polit-
ically accountable agency heads.428 Administrative policymaking often in-
volves serious value choices rather than technical judgments. But the 
departmental structure this Article has unearthed provides a more funda-
mental reason to respect the judgment of subordinate officials beyond their 
expertise. The constitutional structure of executive decision-making limits 
political officers’ jurisdiction to the department they head. Where statutory 
law and executive branch practice have given content to those depart-
ments—creating subordinate offices, requiring procedures to be followed, 
generating binding regulations, specifying qualifications—all of that con-
tent must carry weight when the decision-maker exercises her discretion. 
It is not merely because there is freestanding value to expert decision-mak-
ing that the Secretary should pay close attention to subordinate officials in 
the Bureau of the Census—though surely expertise has its place. Expertise 
has further legal and indeed constitutional significance because such spe-
cialized knowledge is part and parcel of the departmental structure of the 
Executive. Where the head makes a decision that finds no support in the 
administrative record, he undermines the departmental order that enables 
and delimits his authority. Our jurisprudence would be well served by re-
quiring due respect from power holders for the reasoning and judgment of 
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subordinate officers. Agency action should usually be set aside as arbitrary 
and capricious if it does not reasonably incorporate or otherwise respond 
to factual findings and policy analyses presented to the final decision-
maker by subordinate officials with relevant subject-matter expertise or 
authority. 
The majority and the dissenters both failed to engage with the district 
court’s convincing finding that the Secretary had violated the practices of 
the Census Bureau and the rules of the executive branch. The Court thus 
missed another opportunity to underscore the importance of departmental 
structure in constraining executive decision-making. The Justices ought to 
have affirmed the district court’s finding that the agency had violated the 
Accardi doctrine by departing from statistical standards issued through a 
rulemaking process and consistently adhered to by prior secretaries.429 It 
instead upheld the conclusion that the Secretary’s decision was pretextual, 
as the Secretary intended to add the citizenship question and subsequently 
asked the Attorney General to have the Justice Department request the 
addition of the question.430 It is noteworthy that Ross’ concocted justifica-
tion relied again on departmental norms of coordination and comity, pur-
porting to honor the requests of another subordinate department within 
the executive branch. The Court was right to reject this sham departmen-
talism.431 Genuine deliberation and reasoned decision-making between of-
ficials would be undermined if the Court had accepted a plainly contrived 
and dishonest reason. 
The circumstances of this case were “unusual,”432 however. The gov-
ernment itself divulged the crucial memo that prompted the district court 
to order completion of the record and extra-record discovery.433 Such or-
ders are appropriately rare in administrative law, which relies on a “pre-
sumption of regularity” absent a showing of “bad faith.”434 The holding of 
the Census Case rightly condemns official lies disclosed in the course of 
judicial proceedings. But this holding does little to affirm and safeguard 
the departmental architecture that consistently conditions the exercise of 
discretion on procedural conformity, reasoned deliberation, and subject-
matter jurisdiction. 
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B. Leadership of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
In Seila Law,435 the Supreme Court held that the leadership structure 
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was unconstitutional, as the 
Agency held significant statutory powers and was headed by a single offi-
cial removable only for good cause. The case raised departmental concerns 
about checking power within the internal organization of the executive 
branch. As this Article has demonstrated, these checks play an important 
constitutional function in channeling and delimiting political discretion. 
But the maintenance of such controls does not meaningfully turn on 
whether an agency is headed by a single principal officer removable only 
for cause. If the law is duly respectful of departmental norms of reasoned 
decision-making, conformity to agency regulations, and coordinate forms 
of action within departments, then the risk of arbitrary decision-making by 
a single, independent administrator will be kept to a minimum. Maintain-
ing that set of internal controls is far more important for preserving sepa-
ration-of-powers values than striking a removal restriction on a single 
agency head. In this regard, the Trump Administration’s assertion of White 
House control over the CFPB posed a much more serious threat to consti-
tutional values than the Bureau’s single, independent Director. 
The argument in this Section relies largely on functionalist methodol-
ogy to show how statutory law and working governance arrangements play 
a more important role than the formal question of removal authority in 
protecting the system of checks and balances. To this extent, the argument 
might not have great appeal to formalists. However, Seila Law shows uni-
tary theorists relying on both functional and formal arguments to enhance 
presidential power and to diminish institutional controls within the execu-
tive branch. The functional arguments are remarkably weak, whatever may 
be said of the formal arguments.436 
The constitutionality of the CFPB’s leadership structure had previ-
ously been considered by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
PHH Corp. v. CFPB.437 Sitting en banc to review a panel decision authored 
by then-Judge Kavanaugh, the court concluded that single-head for-cause 
removal posed no constitutional difficulties under Humphrey’s Executor 
and Morrison v. Olson.438 In his dissent, then-Judge Kavanaugh renewed 
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his case for striking down the removal restriction, arguing that the consti-
tutional legitimacy of independent commissions rests on checks and bal-
ances between the commissioners: “Multi-member independent agencies 
do not concentrate all power in one unaccountable individual, but instead 
divide and disperse power across multiple commissioners or board mem-
bers.”439 By contrast, “executive agencies” were constitutionally legitimate 
because they were subject to the direction and supervision of the Presi-
dent.440 Then-Judge Kavanaugh thus outlines two independent and per-
haps mutually exclusive models of administrative legitimacy: political ac-
countability to the President or diffusion of power among several principal 
officers. It deserves emphasis that then-Judge Kavanaugh’s distinction be-
tween commissions and executive agencies has no foundation in the Con-
stitution’s text. Rather, he draws a functional distinction between the way 
in which independent commissions check officials’ powers and the way sin-
gle-headed agencies do. 
In Seila Law, Chief Justice Roberts adopted this functional aspect of 
then-Judge Kavanaugh’s reasoning in holding that the CFPB’s structure 
was unconstitutional.441 He distinguished Humphrey’s Executor in part on 
the ground that the independent-commission structure permitted in that 
case was “a multimember body of experts”442 whereas the CPFB was 
headed by a “unilateral actor insulated from presidential control.”443 Fol-
lowing then-Judge Kavanaugh’s alternatives between presidential control 
or the distribution of power among a board, Chief Justice Roberts rea-
soned that “the CFPB’s single-Director configuration is incompatible with 
our constitutional structure. Aside from the sole exception of the Presi-
dency, that structure scrupulously avoids concentrating power in the hands 
of any single individual.”444 A single-Director removable for cause would, 
unlike the chair of commissions like the FTC or the SEC, have “no col-
leagues to persuade.”445 Her authority would be checked neither by other 
principal officers nor by the President. 
The kernel of truth in this position is that checks between officials 
within the executive department are constitutionally valuable. As Madison 
stated on multiple occasions, checks on the “subordinate distributions of 
power” protect the public interest and reduce the risk of arbitrary decision-
making.446 That idea is at the very core of the departmental structure the 
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Constitution outlined and that statute, case law, and executive branch prac-
tice carried into effect. Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s and Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s mistake, however, was to draw a sharp line between commissions and 
executive departments on this score. “From the first,” as Justice Kagan rec-
ognized in her dissent, “Congress debated and enacted measures to create 
spheres of administration . . . detached from direct presidential control.”447 
Modern administrative law has fortified and generalized that early struc-
ture with its principles of review on the record, reasoned decision-making, 
and agency self-binding, all of which distribute authority among multiple 
actors within departments who check one another and their principals. 
Fortifying these general constraints in the case of the CFPB is the statutory 
provision that the Financial Stability Oversight Council, composed of the 
Treasury Secretary and other financial regulatory heads, can set aside 
CFPB rules by a super-majority vote.448 The CFPB Director thus acts un-
der the shadow of review by other officials within the executive branch.449 
The contrast then-Judge Kavanaugh and Chief-Justice Roberts relied 
on between the independent commission and the traditional executive 
agency is thus greatly overdrawn.450 There is no formal or functional basis 
for such a “binary” distinction between “independent” agencies that sit in 
a separate “fourth branch” and “executive agencies” that are subject to the 
President’s control.451 The degree of presidential control over agencies de-
pends on a number of statutory and managerial factors other than for-
cause removal,452 as well as informal “conventions” as to whether or not 
these agencies are directly responsible to the President.453 Statutory frame-
works, agency rules, and historical practice constitute each agency as par-
tially subject to political discretion and partially constituted by durable 
norms. The number of officers who lead the agency and the terms under 
which they may be removed are only some factors relevant to this balance, 
and hardly should form a sufficient basis for a categorical, constitutional 
distinction. 
Chief Justice Roberts and the Court’s majority thus ignored the rich 
heritage of American public law that constitutes departments as well as 
commissions to channel discretion through a network of official obligations 
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and relationships. It was rather Justice Kagan, in dissent, who gave voice 
to the departmental executive: 
 
[T]he Constitution . . . giv[es] Congress broad authority to establish and or-
ganize the Executive Branch. Article II presumes the existence of “Of-
ficer[s] in “executive Departments.” But it does not, as you might think 
from reading the majority opinion, give the President authority to decide 
what kinds of officers—in what departments, with what responsibilities—
the Executive Branch requires. . . . Instead, Article I’s Necessary and Proper 
Clause puts those decisions in the legislature’s hands. Congress has the 
power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” not just its own enumerated powers but also “all other Pow-
ers vested by this Constitutions in the Government of the United States, or 
in any Department or Officer thereof.”454 
 
The Appointments and Opinion Clauses likewise create considerable, if 
somewhat indeterminate, distance between presidential will and the struc-
tures of authority and official responsibility that make up the executive 
branch and its departments.455 The majority opinion in Seila Law failed to 
consider how these constitutional structures, and the public law issuing 
through them, have created internal checks that regularize and restrain the 
head’s conduct. The departmental structure of the Executive, if adequately 
maintained and safeguarded, ensures that principal officers cannot act on 
their own, but must be limited to the reasoning, processes, and jurisdiction 
of the department they head. 
In this respect, the more worrying aspect of the CFPB’s recent history 
was the appointment of Mick Mulvaney, then Director of the White 
House’s Office of Management and Budget, as Acting Director of the 
CFPB.456 As he has in many other cases,457 President Trump relied on the 
Federal Vacancies Reform Act,458 which permits the President to direct 
Senate-confirmed officials to temporarily occupy certain vacant offices to 
which they had not been appointed and for which Senate confirmation 
would ordinarily be required.459 This move effectively subjected the CFPB 
to the direct supervision of the White House, outside of the constitution-
ally prescribed appointment process. Mulvaney’s appointment secured 
presidential control of the Bureau, despite the fact that Congress exempted 
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the CFPB from the OMB’s regulatory review process and labeled the 
Agency an “independent bureau.”460 
The designation of Mulvaney as Acting Director, while permissible 
under the Vacancies Act,461 undermined the distinction between the de-
partmental structures and the President’s personal directive authority. 
Quite arguably, the President should not be permitted to direct a Senate-
confirmed officer to perform the duties of an office in a department differ-
ent from the one to which he was initially confirmed.462 The Supreme Court 
has long held that an already appointed officer may be assigned “additional 
duties, germane to the office already held by them”463 without need for a 
fresh appointment. However, an officer from one department should not 
generally be understood to have duties germane to a post in another.464 The 
appointment of a White House official to lead a subordinate department is 
in some respects more worrying, as it short-circuits the regular channels of 
exchange between the President’s discretionary power and the specialized 
jurisdiction and organization of executive branch components. As this Ar-
ticle has shown, the Constitution contemplates jurisdictionally distinct de-
partments that bind and systematize the duties of the officers so as to pre-
vent arbitrariness or abuse of power. While some departments may have 
overlapping responsibilities, the value of departmental integrity places lim-
its on the interchangeability of official roles. 
It would be far preferable, from the perspective of departmental 
norms, to limit the pool of acting officials to those who already have au-
thority and experience within the department they would be appointed to 
lead.465 The leading expert on the Vacancies Act, Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
has cautioned against restricting the supply of acting officials in this way 
out of concern to preserve adequate staffing and “management exper-
tise.”466 But cross-agency acting appointments are currently rare,467 which 
suggests that limiting such appointments would not pose a major problem 
for governance. If the practice of appointing inter-departmental acting 
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officers goes unchecked, by contrast, emboldened future presidents might 
again use the Vacancies Act more routinely in the way Trump did. They 
might use the Act to fill department leadership with officers who were con-
firmed to posts much more closely linked to the President’s discretionary 
powers, and less bound by distinct statutory and internal departmental 
norms. 
The best solution, given Congress’ primary role in establishing and 
delineating the boundaries of the departments, would be to amend the Va-
cancies Act to preclude or at least severely cabin such cross-agency ap-
pointments.468 With much heavier artillery, the Court could read the Ap-
pointments Clause itself to preclude such appointments.469 The latter 
approach would need to rely on the departmental structure the Constitu-
tion contemplates to distinguish permissible appointments of inferior of-
ficers within a given department to temporarily occupy the post of head of 
department, on the one hand, from impermissible appointments of princi-
pal or inferior officers from one department to head a different one, on the 
other. Alternatively, the judiciary might treat the regulatory decisions of 
agencies under such exogenous leadership with heightened scrutiny. An 
acting official who has been confirmed to lead a different department than 
the one she currently works in might be held presumptively to lack the ex-
pertise that often justifies deference to the agency’s legal interpretations.470 
C. The Special Counsel Investigation 
The Special Counsel’s investigation into Russian interference in the 
2016 election shows that departmental norms do not provide a significant 
limitation on discretionary power where those norms merely protect the 
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prerogatives of political leadership. Equipped with a better understanding 
of the departmental executive, officials should in the future do a better job 
of drafting and interpreting regulations so as to safeguard the integrity of 
their institutions as checks on unlawfulness and abuse of power. 
Inter-departmental delegation and deliberation characterized the 
Special Counsel investigation from start to finish. In 2017, Attorney Gen-
eral Jeff Sessions recused himself from the investigation after having “met 
with the relevant senior career Department officials.”471 Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein then appointed Robert S. Mueller, III as Special 
Counsel because “a Special Counsel is necessary in order for the American 
people to have full confidence in the outcome. Our nation is grounded on 
the rule of law, and the public must be assured that government officials 
administer the laws fairly.”472 The office of Special Counsel was created 
and governed not by statute but by Justice Department procedural regula-
tions,473 issued under the Attorney General’s authority as “head of an Ex-
ecutive department” to “prescribe regulations for the government of his 
department.”474 These regulations obliged the Special Counsel to “comply 
with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies of the De-
partment of Justice” and to “consult with appropriate offices within the 
Department for guidance” but did not make him “subject to the day-to-
day supervision of any official of the Department.”475 The Special Counsel 
could only be removed by the “personal action of the attorney general” for 
“good cause,” including but not limited to “violation of Departmental pol-
icies.”476 
The legal architecture of the Special Counsel’s investigation was thus 
exemplary of departmental form. While the entire authority for that inves-
tigation was rooted in the Attorney General’s statutorily vested powers, 
that authority had been delegated to a deputy, who in turn delegated au-
thority to an office constituted by, bound to, and protected from interfer-
ence by departmental regulations. The reason for this delegation was to 
preserve public confidence in the rule of law within the executive branch. 
The structure of the office internalized within the Department of Justice 
the statutory removal restrictions the Court had condoned in Humphrey’s 
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Executor477 and Morrison v. Olson.478 The regulations implicitly relied on 
the Accardi principle, enforced against the President in United States v. 
Nixon,479 that departmental regulations were binding upon executive offic-
ers’ conduct. 
As written, though, these protections appeared to be less than abso-
lute. One of the principal authors of the special counsel regulations be-
lieved the President could have lawfully ordered Rosenstein to fire 
Mueller, even without repealing the regulations, given that “our Constitu-
tion gives the President the full prosecution power.”480 And the regulations 
themselves conclude with the caveat that they “do not . . . create any 
rights.”481 Perhaps, then, they were not even truly binding. Nonetheless 
Trump faced stiff internal resistance from White House Counsel Donald 
F. McGahn II when he sought to fire Mueller.482 The investigation then ran 
its course and Mueller delivered his report. It speaks to the deep, implicit 
strength of departmental values in our constitutional culture that these ar-
guably unenforceable regulations nonetheless created the shield around 
which Special Counsel Mueller could conduct an investigation implicating 
the conduct of a sitting President. 
The departmental norms that protected Mueller also operated to con-
strain him, however. The regulations required the Special Counsel to 
“comply” with Justice Department “policies.”483 Mueller cited this provi-
sion in declining to “reach a traditional prosecutorial judgment” as to 
whether the President had committed obstruction of justice: 
 
The [Justice Department’s] Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an 
opinion finding that the “indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting 
[P]resident would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive 
branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions” in violation of the 
“constitutional separation of powers.” Given the role of the Special Counsel 
as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of Special 
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Counsel regulations, this Office accepted OLC’s legal conclusion for the 
purpose of exercising prosecutorial discretion. . . . We considered whether 
to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manual standards 
governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to 
apply an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the 
[P]resident committed crimes. . . . Fairness concerns counseled against po-
tentially reaching that judgment when no charges can be brought.484 
 
The Special Counsel’s office thus wrestled with the implications of two 
competing sources of internal departmental law: OLC’s conclusion that a 
sitting President could not be indicted and the Justice Manual’s standards 
as to when a prosecuting attorney should commence or recommend crimi-
nal prosecution. 
Mueller’s conclusion was not inescapable or compelled by those 
sources.485 He might have concluded that, despite OLC’s judgment that a 
sitting President could not be indicted, his office could nonetheless reach a 
conclusion as to whether the President had committed a crime. It is far 
from clear that “fairness concerns” outweighed the public’s and Congress’s 
interest in obtaining a candid prosecutorial assessment of whether the 
President obstructed an investigation into foreign interference into his own 
election. But the institutional commitment of the Justice Department to 
preserving the President’s authority imposed a set of considerations the 
Special Counsel was obliged to consider in how to assess and report on the 
President’s conduct. Where, as in this case, departmental norms develop 
to protect the discretionary power of the President and his principal offic-
ers, such norms will limit internal efforts to police that power. The Mueller 
investigation thus shows the harm that flows from departmental regula-
tions, interpretations, and culture that treat the interests of the presidential 
office as largely coterminous with the constitutional obligations of subor-
dinate departments. To function as safeguards rather than permission slips, 
departmental norms must manifest a commitment to constitutional values 
other than presidential power. 
Mueller’s reasoning also rested on a judgment about the allocation of 
power between the principal departments: “a federal criminal accusation 
against a sitting President would . . . potentially preempt constitutional pro-
cesses for addressing presidential misconduct.”486 Citing to Congress’ con-
stitutional power of impeachment, Mueller suggested that it was ultimately 
the province of the legislative department to try the President’s conduct. 
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He, an inferior officer in the executive department, would render the facts 
by which Congress would assess that conduct. But the legal conclusion 
would rest with the department to which the Constitution had assigned ju-
risdiction. There is reason to doubt Mueller’s judgment on this issue. Con-
gress and the public would arguably have been better served by clear con-
clusions as to legality of the President’s conduct rather than by a rather 
confusing and legalistic evasion of the issue. But there is little doubt that 
Mueller’s judgments were deeply conditioned and constituted by the de-
partmental norms in which he had spent much of his professional life.487 
His investigation shows the virtues as well as limitations of such institu-
tional commitments in policing “apex criminality.”488 
Conclusion 
This article has identified the departmental structures that constrain 
the way in which executive power is exercised by the President and his ap-
pointed officers. The Constitution identified executive departments within 
the structure of Article II and assigned to Congress responsibility to struc-
ture the administration of law. That rudimentary framework has given rise 
to an intricate departmental architecture arising from statutory law, judi-
cial decisions, and executive branch opinions, regulations, and practice. 
This built environment not only restricts but also regularizes and legiti-
mizes the exercise of public power. If properly attended to and maintained, 
it can provide significant assurance that the implementation of law will be 
subject to ongoing deliberation, predictable processes, and relevant 
knowledge. 
During a presidency in which arbitrary exercises of executive power 
seem to have become routine, this departmental structure has been in-
voked and tested as a fundamental safeguard. But departmental norms of 
regular and reasoned government conduct are not self-implementing. The 
constitutional text itself is sparse, leaving the meaning of departments open 
to legal and political construction. The content of the executive depart-
ments has been generated over two and a half centuries of inter-branch 
commitment to republican ideals of rule-bound discretion and coordinate 
authority. While the departments have been designed to retain the distrib-
uted authority placed in them, these institutions’ force and effect is likely 
to dissipate without renewed care and attention. 
With the departmental executive now more clearly in view, the courts, 
Congress, principal officers, and even future presidents should fortify the 
institutional position and authority of subordinate officials in order to dis-
cipline and inform political judgment. If courts come to better recognize 
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departmental norms, states and civil society groups might use litigation to 
enforce principal officers’ obligation to hear staff concerns and abide by 
procedural rules. If Congress revises appointment procedures to better se-
cure departmental integrity, agencies could operate with fewer threats of 
arbitrary political interference. If department heads write procedural rules 
to require the input of multiple subordinate officials, then department 
components will have greater difficulty shortcutting reasoned deliberation. 
Our constitutional culture cannot rely solely on departmental values of 
regularity, official comity, and jurisdictional limitation to preserve a repub-
lican form of government. But a government of laws must manifest such 
virtues if it is to endure. 
